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Abstract
Three Essays in Health Economics
Allison E. Witman
This dissertation consists of three essays in health economics. The first two
essays investigate how the benefit structure of the United States’ two largest
public insurance programs – Medicare and Medicaid – affects beneficiaries and
their families. The first essay examines the impact of an older spouse’s Medicare
eligibility at age 65 on the insurance coverage of a younger, Medicare-ineligible
spouse. I find that Medicare eligibility of an older spouse can crowd-out the
health insurance coverage of a younger spouse, reducing coverage on the extensive
margin as well as the generosity of coverage. Medicare eligibility of an older wife
increases the likelihood that a Medicare-ineligible husband is uninsured. After an
older husband turns 65, younger wives are less likely to be covered through an
employer-based insurance plan and more likely to have non-group coverage.
The second essay investigates the effect of Medicaid coverage of smoking ces-
sation therapies on smoking behavior. Since 1994, most state Medicaid programs
have introduced coverage for smoking cessation therapies such as the nicotine
patch, nicotine gum, prescription medication, and counseling. I show that low-
ering the cost of these cigarette substitutes through Medicaid coverage reduces
smoking among low-income parents who have ever smoked and are likely to be
eligible for Medicaid. Importantly, the effect is concentrated among women with
infants, suggesting that these policies potentially reduce children’s secondhand
smoke exposure.
ix
The third essay provides evidence that family structure is an important factor
influencing attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) diagnosis, especially
for boys. First, we document that a non-traditional family structure is positively
correlated with ADHD diagnosis. Next, we compare the gender gap in ADHD
diagnosis across traditional, single parent, and blended families, finding that the
negative impact of a non-traditional family structure is much larger for boys.
The male-female gap in ADHD is approximately twice as large in non-traditional
families. This excess gender gap in ADHD diagnosis in non-traditional families
is pervasive across child age groups, family income levels, and family size. Our
findings demonstrate that family structure itself is a key factor affecting ADHD
diagnosis and that boys in non-traditional families are especially vulnerable.
Professor Kelly Bedard
Dissertation Committee Chair
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Chapter 1
The Medicare Eligibility Gap
1.1 Introduction
An estimated 10,000 people per day turn 65 and become eligible for Medicare,
a program that provides insurance coverage for 50 million people and comprises
21 percent of national health care spending (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012).1
Given its size and role as the primary health insurance provider to elderly Amer-
icans, Medicare’s effects have been widely studied by economists interested in
the program’s impact on beneficiaries. Medicare beneficiaries experience sudden
changes in health insurance and health care use at age 65, increasing the likeli-
hood of insurance coverage, the rate of multiple coverage, the use of preventative
services, hospitalization, and prescription medications (Card, Dobkin, and Maes-
tas, 2008, 2009; Decker and Rapaport, 2002; Duggan and Morton, 2010; Finkel-
stein and McKnight, 2008; Lichtenberg, 2002; McWilliams, Zaslavsky, Meara, and
Ayanian, 2003; McWilliams, Meara, Zaslavsky, and Ayanian, 2007). Despite the
1In addition to being at least 65, age-based qualification for Medicare requires at least 10
years of Medicare-covered employment by one’s self or spouse. Individuals under age 65 with
certain disabilities also qualify for the program.
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breadth of research investigating the effects of Medicare, the program’s spillovers
to Medicare-ineligible individuals have been largely overlooked.
Medicare is unlike the private health insurance plans that cover most Amer-
icans under age 65 in that it has no coverage provision for family members or
other dependents—Medicare only covers the eligible individual. The age-based
eligibility structure of Medicare means that households with an age difference be-
tween spouses will inevitably encounter a period of time in which the older spouse
is eligible for the program and the younger spouse is not, creating a Medicare-
eligibility gap between spouses.2 Medicare eligibility of an older spouse creates the
potential for spillovers to a younger spouse, caused by an interaction between the
individual-based nature of Medicare and the household-based nature of private in-
surance. When an older spouse turns 65 the household will have to decide whether
the older spouse will take up Medicare coverage, in which case the younger spouse
will need to have their own coverage or go uninsured.
In this paper, I use data from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS)
and a regression discontinuity design to examine the impact of an older spouse’s
Medicare eligibility on the insurance coverage of a younger, Medicare-ineligible
spouse. I find that Medicare eligibility of an older spouse can crowd-out the health
insurance coverage of a younger spouse, reducing coverage on the extensive margin
and the generosity of coverage. In households with an older wife and a younger
husband, Medicare-ineligible husbands are 3.49 percentage points more likely to be
uninsured just after a wife turns 65. This is a 44 percent increase in the fraction of
married men in this age range without insurance coverage. I also provide evidence
2Assuming the younger spouse does not qualify based on disability status.
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that the men who are going uninsured are less educated, working, and relatively
healthy. Second, Medicare-ineligible wives experience large changes in the source
of private coverage when a husband becomes eligible for Medicare. Ineligible wives
move out of private plans in their husband’s name (10.43 percentage point fall)
and into private plans in their own name (9.10 percentage point increase), with
a shift towards coverage that can be characterized as less generous. Additionally,
I find that healthier women are more likely to be uninsured just after a husband
turns 65.
These findings add to existing knowledge on the effects of the Medicare pro-
gram as well as identify Medicare’s age-based eligibility structure as a new source
of crowd-out. Crowd-out is a reduction in private health insurance coverage caused
by eligibility for public health insurance and has exclusively been studied in the
context of Medicaid and Veteran’s Insurance. Newly-eligible individuals may drop
private coverage in favor of public insurance (Blumberg, Dubay, and Norton, 2000;
Boyle and Lahey, 2010; Busch and Duchovny, 2005; Card and Shore-Sheppard,
2004; Dubay and Kenney, 1996, 1997; Lo Sasso and Buchmueller, 2004; Yazici
and Kaestner, 2000; Shore-Sheppard, Buchmueller, and Jensen, 2000); however,
declines in private coverage may not be limited to those who become eligible for
public insurance. Crowd-out can spill over to the family members of public in-
surance eligibles as documented by Cutler and Gruber (1996) and Gruber and
Simon (2008), who report that men whose family members become eligible for
Medicaid reduce employer insurance coverage. Similar to this paper, Boyle and
Lahey (2012) exploit disparate spousal eligibility for public health insurance. The
authors show that wives increased labor supply after Veterans Insurance expan-
3
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sions granted coverage to their husbands. One explanation for this result is that
wives increased labor supply in order to provide health insurance for themselves.
In contrast to previous studies, the crowd-out generated by Medicare results from
a perfectly anticipated increase in access to public coverage. Although the crowd-
out experienced by younger spouses is temporary because they will eventually age
into Medicare themselves, continuous and adequate insurance coverage is impor-
tant for the near-elderly because they are high users of health care and at a higher
risk for health shocks due to their age.
The regression discontinuity design has previously only been used once in
the crowd-out literature in Card and Shore-Sheppard (2004) to study Medicaid-
generated crowd-out. In contrast, the research design has been used extensively in
the Medicare literature to estimate the causal impact of eligibility on the insurance
coverage, health outcomes, and labor market participation of Medicare-eligible in-
dividuals (Card, Dobkin, and Maestas, 2008, 2009; Decker, 2005; Fairlie, Kapur,
and Gates, 2012). Regression discontinuity has the advantage of relying on rel-
atively weak identifying assumptions that approach a randomized experiment;
therefore providing credible evidence that Medicare eligibility of older spouses
reduces the health insurance coverage of younger spouses.
The younger spouses of Medicare-eligible individuals are a group to watch as
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) is implemented. The in-
surance coverage mandate combined with new options for younger spouses (e.g.
health insurance exchanges and Medicaid expansions) will likely reduce the num-
ber of younger spouses going uninsured. Given that relatively healthy younger
spouses are forgoing coverage, the addition of these people to the risk pool will
4
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potentially reduce average costs in this age range. Additionally, new coverage
options for younger spouses that are not tied to employment will reduce the in-
centive for older spouses to remain in the workforce in order to provide health
insurance to the household. Post-ACA, older spouses may take up Medicare at a
higher rate and transitions in coverage for younger spouses could increase when
an older spouse turns 65.
As the baby boom generation ages into Medicare eligibility, policymakers will
undoubtedly propose changes to the benefit structure of the program in an ef-
fort to reduce costs while providing coverage to aging Americans. These results
demonstrate that changes to the Medicare program will not only affect eligible
individuals, but may also impact their family members. Analyses of proposed
modifications to the program should include assessments of the impact on bene-
ficiaries as well as potential spillovers to the spouses of Medicare beneficiaries.
The next section provides an introduction to the Medicare program with a
discussion of how eligibility of one spouse may impact an ineligible spouse. Sec-
tion 3 presents the data, Section 4 presents the econometric specification and
identification assumptions. Section 5 presents results and Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Background
Medicare is government-subsidized insurance available to American citizens
ages 65 years and older.3 Eligible individuals have access to the four components
of Medicare, each covering a specific type of service. Part A covers hospital-related
3Some individuals under age 65 who are disabled or have certain diseases also qualify for
Medicare.
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expenses and is free for most enrollees. Part B covers doctor visits, outpatient
care, and other general services at a cost between $96 and $115 per month.4
Medicare Parts A and B have relatively high cost sharing requirements and do
not cover certain benefits including dental and long term care. As a result, most
beneficiaries have some form of supplemental insurance (e.g. employer retiree
coverage, a Medigap plan, or Medicaid) to fill in holes in the benefit package and
reduce Medicare’s cost sharing burden (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2010). An
alternative to purchasing supplemental coverage is Medicare Part C, also known
as Medicare Advantage. Medicare Part C is comprised of government subsidized,
privately-administered plans that offer more comprehensive benefits than Parts
A and B alone. In 2006, a prescription drug insurance plan was introduced as
Medicare Part D.
An older spouse deciding to take up Medicare coverage represents a trade-
off for families between individual-based and household-based coverage. Using
the example of a Medicare-eligible husband with a Medicare-ineligible wife, let
us consider several cases. First, a wife who provided her own health insurance
prior to her husband’s Medicare eligibility will experience no required change in
coverage when her husband turns 65. Second, if the Medicare-eligible husband is
the primary provider of health insurance to the family, then he can continue to
provide health insurance for the ineligible wife, the wife can purchase insurance
on her own, or she could go uninsured. Options for obtaining health insurance for
the ineligible wife include enrolling in a sponsored plan from her own employer,
4Enrollment in Medicare Parts A and B at age 65 is automatic for individuals receiving Social
Security benefits. Individuals not receiving Social Security benefits at age 65 must contact the
Social Security Administration in order to enroll in the program. Those automatically enrolled
due to receipt of Social Security benefits have the right to refuse Part B coverage.
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purchasing directly from an insurance company in the non-group market, and
qualifying for means-tested government insurance programs.5
Medicare eligibility is both an income and a price shock to the household.
While Medicare is relatively low cost for the older spouse, the cost of insurance
coverage for the younger spouse could increase if the household moves from group
to individual coverage. An individual-based, private plan for the younger spouse
may cost more on a per-person basis than previously held group coverage for both
spouses. This increase in cost for a younger spouse can result in a reduction or
elimination of health insurance coverage.
The welfare implications of an older spouse’s Medicare eligibility vary depend-
ing on the choice of household model.6 Under a unitary framework in which
couples maximize a single household utility function, revealed preference dictates
that a household choosing to put the older spouse on Medicare will be better
off even in the case of the younger spouse losing coverage. However, household
bargaining models generate ambiguous predictions for the utility of the younger
spouse. While the income effect experienced by the older spouse has the poten-
tial to make both spouses better off, the increase in the older spouse’s bargaining
power could result in an equilibrium with lower utility for the younger partner.
The possibility that Medicare’s age-based eligibility structure is leaving younger
spouses worse off merits a discussion of whether or not policy interventions are
5Beginning on October 1, 2013, individuals could apply for coverage using the health insur-
ance marketplaces established by the Affordable Care Act.
6For a survey of theories of the family see Bergstrom (1995). Bargaining models are generally
more accepted than unitary models of household behavior. Seminal papers in the household
bargaining literature include Manser and Brown (1980); McElroy and Horney (1981); Woolley
(1988); Lundberg and Pollak (1991).
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warranted, beginning with an analysis of the ACA’s impact on younger spouses
in the Medicare eligibility gap.
Households can perfectly anticipate Medicare eligibility, meaning that the
younger spouse could adjust their insurance coverage prior to the older spouse
turning 65. For younger spouses who can obtain employer coverage, anticipatory
adjustments would most likely be made during the employer’s annual open en-
rollment period. Medicare eligibility of a spouse is a qualifying event that allows
a younger spouse to reduce coverage or cancel a group health insurance plan any
time of year; however, increases in coverage due to spousal Medicare eligibility
are not permitted outside of the open enrollment period.7 If a younger wife pro-
vides health insurance to the couple from her employer plan, she can remove her
husband from the plan immediately when he turns 65 and maintain her own cov-
erage. Alternatively, if the older husband provides insurance coverage through his
employer, the younger wife would need to sign up for her own employer’s coverage
during the open enrollment period preceding eligibility of her husband to avoid a
lapse in coverage. I investigate this possibility later in the paper and find some
evidence that households are making anticipatory adjustments in coverage.
1.3 Data and Methodology
1.3.1 Data
I use data from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) for years 1993 to
2011. The NHIS is a cross-sectional, nationally representative household survey
7Internal Revenue Service Regulation 1.125-4(e).
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of insurance coverage and health. The first year in the analysis is 1993 because
several key insurance variables enter the survey in the that year.
The sample contains married households with an older spouse within 10 years
of Medicare eligibility (i.e. between 55 and 75 years old). I construct the sample
by first selecting married households. Next, I choose couples with an older spouse
that is between the ages of 55 and 75. Finally, I exclude couples that were born
in the same quarter.8 Same-aged couples are excluded from the sample because
they effectively age into Medicare at the same time and the identification strategy
rests on one spouse aging into Medicare first. There are two types of households in
the sample: older husband, younger wife couples and older wife, younger husband
couples. I focus on the outcomes of the younger spouse in each of these household
types, but will control for characteristics of both spouses in the regressions. The
final sample includes 84,081 younger spouses, comprised of 67,554 younger wives
and 16,527 younger husbands.
Table 1.1 presents selected summary statistics by gender for younger spouses.
The first column includes demographic and insurance characteristics for women
who are younger than their husband and the second column includes the same
information for men who are younger than their wife. Row 1 shows that 80
percent of households in the sample are comprised of older husband, younger
wife couples and 20 percent of households are comprised of older wife, younger
husband households. The average age for younger wives and husband is 58.81
years and 59.78 years, respectively.9 The age gap between spouses is larger for
8Age is measured in quarters in the NHIS.
9No restrictions are made on the age of the younger spouse. The age of younger spouses
ranges from 19 to 74.75 years old. Appendix Figure A.1 plots the age cumulative distribution
function, demonstrating that the majority of younger spouses are above 50 years old.
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older husband, younger wife couples than for older wife, younger husband couples.
On average, a younger wife will have 5 years after her husband turns 65 until she
is Medicare-eligible while the average Medicare eligibility gap for a husband that
is younger than his wife is over 3 years. The mean age difference is driven up by
a small fraction of households with a large age gap between spouses; the median
age difference for each group is smaller at 3.75 and 2 years, respectively.
Panel B of Table 1.1 limits the sample to households with both spouses under
age 65 to show insurance coverage of younger spouses prior to Medicare eligibility
of an older spouse.10 Insurance variables are point-in-time measures of coverage
at the time of the NHIS interview. Among younger spouses, 91 percent report
being insured. Insurance coverage can be obtained through a government program
such as Medicare, Medicaid, or Veteran’s Insurance or through a private health
insurance plan. Private coverage can be purchased through work or non-work
sources and can be in an individual’s own name or under a spouse’s name and is
categorized into four sources: (1) “Self (Work)” is an insurance plan from an in-
dividual’s own employer, (2) “Spouse (Work)” is a plan from a spouse’s employer,
(3) “Spouse (Non-Work)” is a plan obtained from a non-work source under a
spouse’s name, and (4) “Self (Non-Work)” is a non-work plan an individual’s own
name. Non-work insurance is primarily comprised non-group coverage.11,12 The
10Categories of insurance coverage in Table 1.1 are not mutually exclusive because some
individuals report multiple forms of coverage.
11Private coverage from non-employment sources includes plans purchased in the non-group
market, school plans, and plans obtained through local government or community programs.
Approximately 90 percent of private, non-work coverage for Medicare-ineligible individuals in
the sample are non-group plans.
12The NHIS questionnaire asks whether a specific plan is in a person’s own name or a family
member’s name. It is not possible to determine if the family member is a spouse. It is reasonable
to assume that for the majority of married households in this age range, coverage by a family
member is spousal coverage.
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husband’s employer is the primary source of coverage for the majority of house-
holds regardless of whether the male is the older or younger spouse. Younger
wives are most frequently covered via a spouse’s work plan (48 percent), followed
by a plan in the woman’s own name from work (34 percent). Conversely, men
are most often covered via their own work plan (58 percent) followed by a wife’s
work plan (21 percent). The fraction of younger spouses with non-work coverage
is low.
1.3.2 Methodology
In order to test whether Medicare eligibility of an older spouse impacts the
health insurance coverage of a Medicare-ineligible spouse, I compare younger
spouses with an older spouse on either side of the age 65 Medicare eligibility
threshold. If individuals are similar on either side of the threshold, the difference
in outcomes can be interpreted as the causal impact of spousal Medicare eligibility.
The empirical analysis is completed using a reduced-form regression discontinuity
design:
Yij = β0 + β1Spouse65i + β2Self65i + β3Xij + h(Agei, Agej) + εij (1.1)
where Yij is a point-in-time measure of the insurance coverage of younger spouse
i with older spouse j. Yij is a dummy variable indicating whether or not i has a
particular type of insurance coverage. Spouse65i is a dummy variable for Medicare
eligibility of i’s spouse, set to 1 if i ’s spouse is 65 or older and 0 otherwise.
11
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Self65i is a dummy for Medicare eligibility of the younger spouse i, set to 1 if i
is 65 or older and 0 otherwise.13 Xij includes controls for the younger spouse’s
education, race, and an early Social Security eligibility dummy for both the older
and younger spouse.14 The specification includes a quadratic in both spouses’
ages (h(Agei, Agej)) that is fully interacted with post-65 age dummies (one for
the older spouse and one for the younger spouse) to allow the functional form to
vary on either side of the age 65 cutoff. Survey year and region fixed effects are
included. Lastly, εij is an error term that accounts for the impact of unobserved
characteristics on the outcome of interest and standard errors are clustered by
age of the older spouse. Equation (1.1) will be estimated separately for men and
women because spousal Medicare eligibility has heterogeneous effects by gender.
The coefficient β1 is the effect of interest, measuring the impact of an older
spouse turning 65 on the younger spouse’s insurance coverage.15 β1 compares the
insurance of younger spouses with a partner that has recently turned 65 to the
insurance coverage of younger spouses with a partner that is just below age 65.
Thus, β1 measures the effect of turning 65 relative to a pre-65 control group that
knows with certainty when they will enter eligibility for Medicare. In contrast to
regression discontinuity designs that compare treated and untreated groups, age-
13The coefficient β2 on Self65i gives the impact of a younger spouse’s own Medicare eligibility
on their own insurance coverage. This is the effect measured in Card, Dobkin, and Maestas (2008,
2009) and is not the focus of this paper. These coefficients are presented in Appendix Table
A.3.
14Individuals have the option of taking Social Security benefits as early as age 62. The Social
Security eligibility dummy equals 1 if the individual is greater than 62 and 0 otherwise.
15β1 captures the reduced-form effect of spousal Medicare eligibility rather than take up.
Figure A2 shows the first-stage graph and estimate of 0.64 (i.e., the effect of an older spouse
turning 65 on take up of Medicare). Instrumental variables estimates of spousal Medicare take
up are βˆ1/0.64.
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based treatment makes a comparison between those who are treated and those
who will soon be treated.16
1.3.3 Identification
The regression discontinuity research design is compelling because it overcomes
the omitted variable bias problem given a modest set of assumptions. Moreover,
some of the assumptions are partially testable. Interpretation of the effects of
Medicare eligibility on outcomes as causal requires two assumptions (Lee and
Lemieux, 2009). First, the conditional expectation functions of the potential
outcomes must be continuous with respect to age across the Medicare eligibil-
ity threshold, which is analogous to saying that in the absence of treatment at
age 65 outcomes would trend smoothly. There are two standard test for violation
of the continuity assumption. First, there should be no changes in other variables
across the threshold if this assumption holds. I test for discontinuities in educa-
tion, race, labor market participation, health status, and Social Security receipt
and present the results in Figure A3 and Table A2. These estimates are all statis-
tically insignificant except for a decline in the fraction of the sample that is white,
which is likely due to sampling error given that none of the other background
characteristics change at the threshold. Second, I plot the density function of the
running variable (spousal age) and test for a discontinuity at the age-65 threshold
16Age-based treatment is common in regression discontinuity settings. Other examples include
the minimum legal drinking age, age notches in the calculation of public benefits, the age 19
limit on parental insurance coverage, and other papers using the age 65 Medicare eligibility
threshold (Decker and Rapaport, 2002; Card and Shore-Sheppard, 2004; Card, Dobkin, and
Maestas, 2008; Lemieux and Milligan, 2008; Carpenter and Dobkin, 2009; Card, Dobkin, and
Maestas, 2009; Yoruk and Yoruk, 2011; Shigeoka, forthcoming).
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of Medicare eligibility per McCrary (2008) in Figure A4. I find no evidence of
violation of the continuity assumption with this second test.
Secondly, the monotonicity assumption requires that crossing the age 65 thresh-
old cannot cause some people to take up Medicare coverage and others to reject it.
The monotonicity assumption would be violated if the older spouse j had Medi-
care coverage before turning 65 but dropped it upon reaching the 65 threshold.
Although I cannot test whether this assumption holds given the cross-sectional
nature of the data, it is unlikely that a person who qualified for Medicare prior to
age 65 due to disability or illness would drop coverage specifically because they
turned 65.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Main Findings
I begin with a graphical depiction of the insurance coverage of the younger
spouse as a function of the older spouse’s Medicare eligibility in Figure 1.1. Panels
(a) and (b) plot the average rate of insurance coverage and private coverage for
younger wives. Panels (c) and (d) plot the average rate of insurance coverage and
private coverage for younger husbands. The horizontal axis is the older spouse’s
age in quarters and each graph contains a vertical line at the spousal age of 65
to indicate Medicare eligibility. Solid curves show the quadratic fit of the raw
means on either side of the Medicare eligibility cutoff. A dashed line indicates the
fraction of younger spouses that are age-eligible for Medicare, corresponding to
the right axis of each graph.
14
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There is no evidence of crowd-out among Medicare-ineligible wives in panels (a)
and (b) of Figure 1.1, with no clear discontinuity in insurance coverage or private
coverage at the spousal age of 65. Table 1.2 presents estimates of discontinuities in
insurance coverage upon spousal Medicare eligibility corresponding to Figure 1.1
using equation (1.1). The top row of the table lists the dependent variable for each
regression. The column labeled “Mean” presents the fraction of younger spouses
with the given coverage in the two years prior to the older spouse’s Medicare
eligibility. The estimated discontinuities and standard errors are presented under
the column labeled “RD.” The results for women are presented in Panel A. The
fraction of women with insurance coverage falls by 1.24 percentage points just after
a husband turns 65, but the point estimate does not reach statistical significance.
Husband Medicare eligibility causes no changes in the fraction of women with
government coverage, private coverage, or multiple sources of coverage. On the
surface, husband Medicare eligibility does not appear to cause a reduction in the
fraction of women with health insurance, which is reassuring given that women
are more likely to be insured via their husband and are less likely to have an
alternate source of coverage through their own employer.
Medicare-ineligible men, on the other hand, experience reductions in coverage
when their wife turns 65. In panels (c) and (d) of Figure 1, the fraction of men
reporting any insurance coverage and private coverage falls discontinuously to the
right of the spousal age 65 threshold. Panel B of Table 1.2 presents the estimated
discontinuities for younger husbands. The fraction of men who are insured falls
by 3.49 percentage points and the fraction of men with private coverage falls 4.73
percentage points when an older wife turns 65. This is a 44 percent increase
15
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in the number of men who are uninsured and a 6 percent decrease in private
coverage. The approximately 2 percentage point difference between the fall in
private coverage and any coverage is comprised of a fall in multiple forms of
coverage for younger husbands.
The asymmetry of findings for men and women is striking and possible ex-
planations will be explored at the end of this section. First, I investigate private
coverage more closely by focusing on the source of private health insurance.
Figure 1.2 plots the sources of private insurance coverage for younger spouses
with corresponding estimates presented in Table 1.3. For women, spousal Medi-
care eligibility is associated with a movement out of coverage under a husband’s
name and into coverage in the wife’s own name. Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 1.2
show insurance coverage of younger wives in a husband’s name and in a wife’s own
name, respectively. Both work and non-work coverage from an older husband fall
discontinuously when a husband turns 65. As reported in Panel A of Table 1.3,
the largest decline in coverage is from a husband’s employer with an estimated
reduction of 8.04 percentage points compared to a 2.39 percentage point reduction
in spousal non-work coverage.
Wives offset the decline in private coverage from a husband by increasing
coverage in their own name, as shown in panel (b) of Figure 2. The estimated
increase in coverage from a wife’s own employer is 4.62 percentage points and
the increase non-work coverage in their own name is 4.48 percentage points as
shown in Table 1.3. Thus, women take up insurance from both their employer
and non-work sources approximately equally when an older husband reaches Medi-
care eligibility. As a result of this movement, the composition of private coverage
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for Medicare-ineligible women is different on either side of the husband Medicare
eligibility threshold. Husband Medicare eligibility causes net movement out of
employer-provided plans and net movement into non-work (usually non-group)
plans for coverage. Historically, non-group coverage has been considered less
generous than employer coverage, covering fewer benefits and requiring higher
out-of-pocket costs.
Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 1.2 plot the fraction of men with private coverage
in their wife’s name and own name with corresponding estimates presented in
Panel B of Table 1.3. The fraction of husbands covered via a wife’s employer falls
by 6.98 percentage points when an older wife turns 65 and can be seen in Panel
(a) of Figure 1.2. Unlike younger wives, younger husbands do not offset this fall in
spousal coverage by taking up coverage in their own name. There are no changes
in coverage in a husband’s own name form either work or non-work sources.
In summary, when an older spouse turns 65 younger spouses experience a
decline in coverage from the older parter. Younger wives offset this fall in spousal
coverage by taking up plans in their own name from work and non-work sources.
Younger husbands do not offset the fall in spousal coverage and as a result, the
fraction of men without insurance increases.
There are several possible explanations for the higher propensity of males to go
uninsured. First, varying attitudes towards risk could explain some component
of men’s willingness to forgo coverage. Evidence from experimental economics
demonstrates that men are less risk averse than women (Eckel and Grossman,
2008; Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Charness and Gneezy, 2012). Younger husbands’
increased tolerance for risk is consistent with the results in Cutler, Finkelstein, and
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McGarry (2008), who find that individuals who have a higher risk tolerance are
more willing to go uninsured. Second, the available coverage options for younger
husbands may be different than for younger wives. The decline in coverage for
men is driven by a reduction in an older wife’s work plan. The men who lose
coverage from their wife may not have access to an employer plan because if they
did, they likely would have already been the provider of health insurance to the
family. Additionally, gender asymmetries in access and cost in the non-group
market may explain the heterogeneous results. Additionally, coverage in the non-
group market for men over 60 was also more expensive than for women prior to
the Affordable Care Act. In addition to differential preferences for coverage across
men and women, forces in the non-group market may contribute to men’s higher
propensity to lose coverage in the Medicare eligibility gap.
1.4.2 Heterogeneity
I now examine heterogeneity of effects across three margins: completed educa-
tion, labor force participation, and health status.17 While each of these categories
is smooth across the spousal age 65 threshold, both labor market participation
and health are declining functions of spousal (and own) age.18 As a consequence,
the bandwidth in a regression discontinuity design would ideally be smaller than
the bandwidth used in this paper. However, given the sample size required for
adequate power I estimate equation (1.1) with the full bandwidth. The results
17Estimates by race are available upon request. The relatively small sample size of non-white
respondents makes identifying effects by race infeasible.
18Appendix Table A.2 presents estimated discontinuities in education, labor force participa-
tion, and health status at spousal Medicare eligibility. Accompanying graphs are in Appendix
Figures A.3 and A.4.
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provide interesting evidence that certain groups are more affected by the Medicare
eligibility gap, but should be interpreted with caution.
Table 1.4 presents coefficients from a separate regression for the group listed
in the first column of the table.19 Panel A shows results by education level.
For younger wives, there is no differential effect on insurance coverage or private
coverage by education level when a husband turns 65. However, education level
does play a role for men. Younger husbands with a high school or less education
are 5.31 percentage points less likely to have insurance coverage after a wife turns
65. This result is statistically different from the insignificant point estimate for
husbands with at least some college. Panel B presents results by labor market
participation status, which is not a source of notable heterogeneity for younger
wives. The fall in insurance coverage for men who are working is 4.05 percentage
points, which is a larger estimated effect than the 2.46 percentage point fall in
coverage for non-working men, although not statistically different. Lastly, Panel
C includes coefficients from estimates by health status. Healthy wives are 1.10
percentage points less likely to have insurance coverage and healthy husbands are
5.42 percentage points less likely to have insurance coverage after an older spouse
turns 65. Results for insurance coverage of younger spouses from Table 1.4 are
presented graphically in Figure 1.3.
A new result emerges from this analysis showing that a higher fraction of
healthy men and women are uninsured after a spouse turns 65. The propensity for
healthier individuals to go uninsured is evidence of adverse selection in the health
insurance market, which is a standard empirical finding summarized in Cutler
19Regressions are run separately for each group. Results are similar when the groups are
pooled and the Spouse65 variable is interacted with group categories.
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and Zeckhauser (2000) and recently revisited by Einav, Finkelstein, and Cullen
(2010). Consequently, healthy individuals may be making an optimal choice to go
uninsured if they do not forgo necessary care or experience a health shock during
the Medicare eligibility gap. However, the men who are becoming uninsured also
appear to be working and have less than a high school education. This group of
men may have jobs that do not offer health insurance coverage, may find the cost
of non-group coverage prohibitively high, and may not be able to afford to pay for
treatment out of pocket after a health shock. The Affordable Care Act’s insurance
mandate may bring these relatively healthy individuals into the health insurance
market, improving the health of individuals in the risk pool and potentially driving
down average costs for this age group.
1.4.3 Robustness Checks
In Table 1.5, I present several robustness checks of the main findings. The
main identifying assumption in a regression discontinuity design is that the treat-
ment and control group are comparable; therefore, removing demographic con-
trols from the regression should not affect the estimates. The first row of Table
1.5 presents the main estimates from Tables 1.2 and 1.3 using a second order
polynomial and controlling for background characteristics. The next row, labeled
“Second Order Polynomial, No Controls” presents results from regressions with-
out background characteristics, including only a quadratic polynomial in the older
spouse’s age that differs on either side of the eligibility threshold, a dummy for
the older spouse’s eligibility, a dummy for the younger spouse’s eligibility, year
fixed effects, and region fixed effects. The point estimates are very similar to the
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main specifications that include demographic controls. One exception is that the
point estimate on government coverage for younger wives becomes statistically
significant. There is no reason to believe that government coverage should fall
discontinuously and this result is likely due to sampling error.
Additionally, estimates can vary with the choice of polynomial. The main
specification in this paper uses a second order polynomial, which is standard in
papers using the NHIS and a regression discontinuity design. Nevertheless, the
third row of Table 1.5 presents coefficients from regressions in which the age of
the older and younger spouse is with a third degree polynomial. On the whole,
varying the degree of polynomial produces similar results as the main specification
with few exceptions.
The regression discontinuity framework identifies discrete changes in coverage
at the age 65 cutoff of spousal Medicare eligibility; however, households anticipat-
ing Medicare eligibility of an older spouse may adjust the coverage of a younger
spouse ahead of time. Anticipatory adjustments will not be embodied in the es-
timated discontinuities in coverage, potentially biasing coefficients towards zero
and underestimating the impact of spousal Medicare eligibility. The “donut”
regression discontinuity design removes observations near the cutoff, generating
estimates that embody changes at and around the discontinuity (Barreca, Lindo,
and Waddell, 2011).20 In the fourth row of Panels A and B in Table 1.5, I re-
estimate equation (1.1) excluding couples with an older spouse within 6 months
of Medicare eligibility, leaving a 1 year donut in the data. These estimates in-
20The donut design is most frequently cited as a method to account for heaping in the data,
but can also be used to address changes in behavior due to anticipation of treatment as in
Barcellos and Jacobson (2014).
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clude changes in insurance coverage that not only occur right at age 65, but also 6
months before and after an older spouse is 65. This exercise yields a statistically
significant 2.88 and 4.52 percentage point reduction in the fraction of younger
wives and husbands with insurance coverage. Overall, the point estimates from
this specification are slightly larger in absolute value than the main estimates for
both younger husbands and wives, indicating that some adjustments in coverage
are made before and after the older spouse 65.
Lastly, I address the concern that the results could be confounded by couples
close in age because the younger spouse ages into Medicare just after the older
spouse. In the fifth row of Table 1.5, I limit the sample to couples with at least a
one year age gap between the older and younger spouse. Although the standard
errors increase slightly, the point estimates are very similar to those presented in
Tables 1.2 and 1.3. On the whole, results do not appear to be driven by couples
that are very close in age.
1.5 Discussion
As the baby boom generation begins to reach the age of Medicare eligibility, an
increasing number of married households will face a tradeoff between household-
based coverage and individual-based coverage, or may even consider forgoing cov-
erage for a Medicare-ineligible spouse. In this paper, I find that Medicare eligibil-
ity of an older spouse can crowd-out the insurance coverage of a younger spouse.
Younger husbands who are relatively healthy, working, and have less than a high
school education are less likely to have insurance just after a wife turns 65. Rel-
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atively healthy women are more likely to be uninsured after a husband turns 65;
but the biggest change in coverage for women occurs on the intensive margin.
Private coverage in a husband’s name falls and coverage in a wife’s own name
increases with an increase in the fraction of women insured via plans that can be
considered less generous.
Younger spouses of Medicare-eligible individuals will be one group impacted by
the changes in the insurance market after the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (ACA). The health insurance exchanges are a new source of coverage
for younger spouses and may be an attractive option given the projected decline
in premiums in the over-60 non-group market (O’Connor, 2013) combined with
the premium subsidies available for households between 138 and 400 percent of
the poverty line. The evidence of adverse selection in the under-65 market gen-
erated by Medicare eligibility of older spouses presented in this paper suggests
that some new entrants to the insurance market in this age range will be rela-
tively healthy. Importantly, the availability of an alternative source of coverage for
younger spouses means that older spouses will be more likely to take up Medicare
and will have less incentive to remain in the workforce to provide health insurance
for a Medicare-ineligible spouse.
Medicare will undoubtedly remain a focal point of policymakers trying to bal-
ance providing adequate insurance coverage for the growing number of elderly
Americans with the need to curb rapidly increasing health care costs. Because
most Americans have household-level coverage prior to Medicare eligibility, pro-
posals such as raising the age of eligibility to 67 or changing the benefit structure
of the program will not only affect newly eligible individuals, but also their family
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members. Analyses of proposed changes to the program should include assess-
ments of the impact on beneficiaries as well as potential spillovers to the spouses
of Medicare beneficiaries.
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Figure 1.1: Health Insurance Coverage of Younger Spouses
(a) Women: Insured (b) Women: Private Coverage
(c) Men: Insured (d) Men: Private Coverage
Note: Graphs show the reduced form effect of spousal Medicare eligibility on the health insurance
coverage of the younger spouse. Scatterplots are means of the raw data and solid lines are
quadratic polynomial fits. The dashed line shows the fraction younger spouses eligible for
Medicare using the right axis.
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Figure 1.2: Sources of Private Coverage of Younger Spouses
(a) Women: Coverage by Spouse (b) Women: Coverage by Self
(c) Men: Coverage by Spouse (d) Men: Coverage by Self
Note: Graphs show the reduced form effect of spousal Medicare eligibility on the source of
private health insurance for the younger spouse. Scatterplots are means of the raw data and
solid lines are quadratic polynomial fits. The dashed line shows the fraction younger spouses
eligible for Medicare using the right axis.
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Figure 1.3: Fraction of Younger Spouses with Insurance Coverage by Subpopula-
tion
(a) Women: High School or Less (b) Men: High School or Less
(c) Women: Working (d) Men: Working
(e) Women: Healthy (f) Men: Healthy
Note: Graphs show the reduced form effect of spousal Medicare eligibility on insurance of the
younger spouse for different subpopulations. Scatterplots are means of the raw data and solid
lines are quadratic polynomial fits.
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Table 1.1: Selected Summary Statistics of Younger Spouses
Women Men
% of Sample 80.15 19.85 
Age 58.81 59.78 
Age Gap Between Spouses 5.00 3.40 
Education
% Less than High School 14.91 18.17 
% High School 37.88 30.06 
% Some College 24.69 23.55 
% More than College 22.52 28.22 
Race
% White 83.41 82.37 
% Black 6.32 6.93 
% Hispanic 3.86 3.03 
% Other 6.41 7.67 
N 67,554 16,527
Women Men
% Insured 91.16 91.08 
% Government Coverage 8.66 12.32 
% Private Coverage 85.32 82.72 
% 2+ Sources of Coverage 8.75 9.06 
Source of Private Coverage
% Self (Work) 33.52 57.71 
% Self (Non-Work) 3.34 5.44 
% Spouse (Work) 48.33 21.19 
% Spouse (Non-Work) 4.05 1.04 
Panel A: Demographic Characteristics
Panel B: Insurance Characteristics Prior to Spousal Medicare Eligibility
Note: Summary statistics are from pooled 1993 to 2011 NHIS data. Panel A presents demographic characteristics of 
younger husbands and wives whose older spouse is within ten years of Medicare eligibility (between 55 and 75 years 
old). Panel B restricts the sample to households with both a husband and a wife that are below age 65.
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Table 1.2: The Impact of Spousal Medicare Eligibility on Insurance Coverage of
the Younger Spouse
Mean RD Mean RD Mean RD Mean RD
Spouse65 91.54 -1.24 11.32 -0.69 83.77 -0.41 8.75 -0.08
(0.80) (0.67) (1.14) (0.66)
Mean RD Mean RD Mean RD Mean RD
Spouse65 92.10 -3.49* 17.63 0.52 80.50 -4.73* 9.69 -1.98
(1.47) (2.01) (2.12) (1.74)
Note: Table presents reduced form estimates of spousal Medicare eligibility on the insurance coverage of a younger spouse using 
NHIS data from 1993 to 2011. The dependent variable in each regression is listed above the columns labeled 'Mean' and 'RD.'  
Entries in the 'Mean' column are the fraction of younger spouses with the given type of coverage in the two years prior to an older 
spouse's Medicare eligibility. Regressions include controls for race and education of the younger spouse, quadratics in the age of 
both spouses separately interacted with dummy variables for Medicare eligibility of the younger and older spouse at age 65, 
dummy variables for both spouses' Social Security eligibility at age 62, region, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered by spouse age and are presented in parentheses.
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Panel B: Men
Insured Government Private 2+ Plans
Insured Government Private 2+ Plans
Panel A: Women
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Table 1.3: The Impact of Spousal Medicare Eligibility on the Source of Private
Insurance Coverage of the Younger Spouse
Mean RD Mean RD Mean RD Mean RD
Spouse65 45.53 -8.04*** 5.18 -2.39*** 32.18 4.62** 4.46 4.48***
(1.66) (0.63) (1.54) (0.43)
Mean RD Mean RD Mean RD Mean RD
Spouse65 18.54 -6.98** 1.21 0.49 55.13 0.45 7.51 0.69
(2.26) (0.73) (2.73) (1.36)
Note: Table presents reduced form estimates of spousal Medicare eligibility on the insurance coverage of a younger spouse using 
NHIS data from 1993 to 2011. The dependent variable in each regression is listed above the columns labeled 'Mean' and 'RD.'  
Entries in the 'Mean' column are the fraction of younger spouses with the given type of coverage in the two years prior to an 
older spouse's Medicare eligibility. Regressions include controls for race and education of the younger spouse, quadratics in the 
age of both spouses separately interacted with dummy variables for Medicare eligibility of the younger and older spouse at age 
65, dummy variables for both spouses' Social Security eligibility at age 62, region, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered by spouse age and are presented in parentheses.
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Panel A: Women
Spouse (Work) Spouse (Non-Work) Self (Work) Self (Non-Work)
Panel B: Men
Spouse (Work) Spouse (Non-Work) Self (Work) Self (Non-Work)
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Table 1.4: The Impact of Spousal Medicare Eligibility on Insurance Coverage of
the Younger Spouse, by Selected Characteristics of the Younger Spouse
Insured Private Insured Private
High School or Less -1.25 -0.17 -5.31* -4.00
(1.26) (1.88) (2.56) (3.05)
Some College Plus -1.15 -0.81 -1.39 -5.12
(0.81) (1.28) (1.45) (2.62)
Insured Private Insured Private
Working 0.28 0.41 -4.05* -4.03
(1.01) (1.27) (1.87) (2.34)
Not Working -2.07 -0.27 -2.46 -3.23
(1.11) (1.61) (2.17) (3.73)
Insured Private Insured Private
Poor/Fair 1.30 4.88 0.90 -2.94
(2.30) (3.34) (2.44) (6.43)
Good/VeryGood/Excellent -1.10* -1.10 -5.42** -7.98**
(0.54) (0.80) (1.61) (2.49)
Panel B: Working & Not Working
Panel C: Health Status Poor/Fair & Good/Very Good/Excellent
Women Men
Note: Table presents reduced form estimates of spousal Medicare 
eligibility on the insurance coverage of a younger spouse using NHIS data 
from 1993 to 2011. Each coefficient is from a separate regression for the 
group listed in the leftmost column of the table. Regressions include 
quadratics in the age of both spouses separately interacted with dummy 
variables for Medicare eligibility of the younger and older spouse at age 65, 
dummy variables for both spouses' Social Security eligibility at age 62, 
region, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by spouse age 
and are presented in parentheses.
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Women Men
Women Men
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Table 1.5: Robustness Checks
Insured Gov Private 2+ Plans Spouse (Work)
Spouse 
(Non-Work)
Self 
(Work)
Self 
(Non-Work)
Second Order Polynomial (Orignial Estimates)
Spouse65 -1.24 -0.69 -0.41 -0.08 -8.04*** -2.39*** 4.62** 4.48***
(0.80) (0.67) (1.14) (0.66) (1.66) (0.63) (1.54) (0.43)
Second Order Polynomial, No Controls
Spouse65 -1.34 -1.33* -0.42 -0.90 -7.21*** -2.89*** 3.99** 4.51***
(0.72) (0.58) (1.02) (0.61) (1.50) (0.64) (1.50) (0.42)
Third Order Polynomial
Spouse65 0.40 -0.54 1.01 -0.09 -7.35*** -2.59*** 5.12** 4.83***
(0.64) (0.73) (1.18) (0.67) (2.00) (0.75) (1.81) (0.49)
Donut RD
Spouse65 -2.88* 0.20 -2.18 0.86 -10.80*** -2.19* 6.51** 3.78***
(1.09) (1.11) (1.35) (1.04) (1.58) (1.03) (1.95) (0.72)
Age Gap>1 Year
Spouse65 -0.84 -0.65 -0.37 -0.24 -7.60*** -2.38** 4.28* 4.54***
(0.87) (0.73) (1.25) (0.66) (1.76) (0.74) (1.81) (0.55)
Insured Gov Private 2+ Plans Spouse (Work)
Spouse 
(Non-Work)
Self 
(Work)
Self 
(Non-Work)
Second Order Polynomial (Orignial Estimates)
Spouse65 -3.49* 0.52 -4.73* -1.98 -6.98** 0.49 0.45 0.69
(1.47) (2.01) (2.12) (1.74) (2.26) (0.73) (2.73) (1.36)
Second Order Polynomial, No Controls
Spouse65 -4.61** -1.36 -5.91** -3.88* -6.74** 0.28 0.19 -0.81
(1.39) (2.10) (1.94) (1.66) (2.19) (0.68) (2.53) (1.31)
Third Order Polynomial
Spouse65 -3.15 -0.68 -2.20 0.26 -6.56* 0.15 4.58 0.58
(1.65) (2.43) (2.32) (1.89) (2.79) (0.72) (2.49) (1.41)
Donut RD
Spouse65 -4.52* 2.88 -7.21* -1.66 -9.38*** 1.17 -2.25 1.38
(2.19) (2.65) (3.15) (2.69) (2.61) (1.29) (4.22) (2.42)
Age Gap>1 Year
Spouse65 -2.40 -0.22 -4.12 -3.96* -7.58** 1.08 0.22 0.18
(2.09) (2.48) (2.55) (1.72) (2.79) (0.83) (3.34) (1.28)
Panel A: Women
Panel B: Men
Note: Table presents reduced form estimates of spousal Medicare eligibility on the insurance coverage of a younger spouse using NHIS data from 1993 to 2011. 
Each coefficient is from a separate regression using the specification described in the leftmost column of the table. Standard errors are clustered by spouse age and 
are presented in parentheses.
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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Chapter 2
Medicaid Coverage of Smoking
Cessation Treatment and
Smoking
2.1 Introduction
Despite reductions in smoking rates over time, tobacco use remains the leading
cause of preventable mortality in the United States. Smoking imposes substantial
costs to society as a whole, both in terms of lives lost and dollars spent. Nearly
450,000 Americans die from smoking-related diseases annually while an estimated
$193 billion in direct medical costs and productivity losses are incurred each year
(Adhikari, Kahende, Malarcher, Pechacek, and Tong, 2008). Still, 19 percent of
American adults smoke and continuing to lower the smoking rate is a primary
goal of public health policy. The Affordable Care Act (ACA) addresses smoking
directly by mandating that insurers cover smoking cessation treatments (SCT)
such as the nicotine patch, nicotine gum, and prescription medications beginning
in 2010 for pregnant women and 2014 for all individuals. This mandate, in com-
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bination with the ACA’s expansion of Medicaid eligibility to adults up to 138
percent of the federal poverty line will greatly increase access to quitting aids for
this group whose health care costs are largely borne by taxpayers.
By requiring that insurers cover smoking cessation therapies, the ACA effec-
tively reduces the cost of cigarette substitutes to insured smokers. This paper
estimates a causal relationship between a reduction in the price of cigarette sub-
stitutes and smoking behavior using state variation in the timing of Medicaid
coverage for nicotine dependence treatment as a natural experiment. I estimate a
linear probability model of smoking behavior using repeated cross-sectional data
from the Current Population Survey Tobacco Use Supplements (CPS-TUS) be-
tween 1998 and 2007. Medicaid coverage of smoking cessation therapies reduces
smoking by 4.33 percentage points among the sample of low-income parents who
are current or former smokers and are likely to be eligible for Medicaid. The
smoking rate for this group is 71 percent, translating to a 6 percent reduction
in smoking. This effect is concentrated among women with very young children,
suggesting that these policies have the additional benefit of reducing secondhand
smoke exposure among children.
I also employ Medicaid prescription drug utilization data to document signif-
icant heterogeneity in take-up of the benefit across states. Among a subsample
of states that introduced the benefit, the number of doses of SCTs prescribed
ranged from nearly 14 thousand in Illinois to 10 in South Dakota 4 years after
the benefit initiated. Increasing take-up of the benefit among smokers should be
a because Medicaid beneficiaries are 53 percent more likely to smoke than the
general adult population (Armour and Fiebelkorn, 2009). As a result, this group
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whose health care expenditures are publicly funded suffer disproportionately from
smoking-related health problems. Armour and Fiebelkorn (2009) estimate that 11
percent of Medicaid expenditures are attributable to smoking, totaling 22 billion
dollars in 2004.
Other policy interventions to reduce smoking such as cigarette excise taxes,
indoor smoking bans, advertising restrictions, and public health information cam-
paigns have focused on raising the cost to smoke or changing preferences for smok-
ing. These policies have been widely studied by economists, especially cigarette
excise taxes and indoor smoking bans.1 Cigarette taxes are largely agreed upon
as an effective means to reduce smoking (Chaloupka and Warner, 2000). How-
ever, smokers may engage in compensating behavior in response to cigarette tax
increases by inhaling more deeply and switching to cigarettes with higher nico-
tine content, suggesting that estimates of the public health benefit resulting from
higher cigarette taxes are overstated (Evans and Farrelly, 1998; Farrelly, Bray,
Pechacek, and Woollery, 2001; Adda and Cornaglia, 2006; Abrevaya and Puzzello,
2012). Clean indoor air laws that prohibit smoking in workplaces, bars, restau-
rants, etc. are primarily aimed at reducing secondhand smoke exposure by pro-
hibiting smoking inside buildings, but also have the effect of reducing smoking in
general (Chaloupka and Warner, 2000; Carpenter, 2009; Bitler, Carpenter, and
Zavodny, 2010; Carpenter, Postolek, and Warman, 2011).
1The economic literature on smoking is very large. I refer readers to the extensive review of
the smoking literature prior to 2000 in Chaloupka and Warner (2000). Selected recent papers
include DeCicca, Kenkel, and Mathios (2002); Tauras and Chaloupka (2003); Chaloupka and
Tauras (2004); Saffer, Wakefield, and Terry-McElrath (2007); DeCicca and McLeod (2008);
Carpenter (2009); Adda and Cornaglia (2010); Bitler, Carpenter, and Zavodny (2010); Anger,
Kvasnicka, and Siedler (2011); Carpenter, Postolek, and Warman (2011); Abrevaya and Puzzello
(2012); Callison and Kaestner (2013).
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Insurance coverage of smoking cessation treatment differs from cigarette taxes
and smoking bans in two ways. First, taxes and bans raise the monetary and time
cost of smoking while insurance coverage of smoking cessation therapies lowers
the cost of cigarette substitutes. In this manner, SCT coverage is more similar to
interventions that provide incentives to quit smoking (Volpp, Gurmankin Levy,
Asch, Berlin, Murphy, Gomez, Sox, Zhu, and Lerman, 2006; Volpp, Troxel, Pauly,
Glick, Puig, Asch, Galvin, Zhu, Wan, DeGuzman, Corbett, Weiner, and Audrain-
McGovern, 2009; Gin, Karlan, and Zinman, 2010). Second, cigarette taxes and
smoking bans reduce smoking along two possible margins — by preventing ini-
tiation of smoking among non-smokers and by reducing smoking among current
smokers. Insurance coverage of SCTs reduces smoking along the second margin
only, by helping current smokers quit. While preventing initiation of smoking cir-
cumvents its health consequences altogether, quitting smoking can reverse many
of its negative health effects. Smokers who quit experience reductions in the health
costs of smoking including lower risk of cancer, coronary heart disease, and stroke
and benefit from more years of life (Novello, 1990; Ostbye, Taylor, and Jung, 2002;
Ostbye and Taylor, 2004).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides background information
about Medicaid coverage of smoking cessation therapies and take-up of the ben-
efit. Section 2.3 describes the data used for the empirical analysis and includes
descriptive statistics for the sample. Section 2.4 explains the econometric strategy,
followed by the estimation results in Section 2.5. Placebo checks are included in
Section 2.6 and Section 2.7 concludes.
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2.2 Background
2.2.1 Medicaid Coverage of Smoking Cessation Treatments
Medicaid is government-subsidized health insurance for over 62 million low-
income children, pregnant women, low-income adults, and disabled adults. Chil-
dren comprise 49 percent of Medicaid’s beneficiaries, 25 percent are non-disabled
adults, and the remainder are disabled adults and elderly Medicare-Medicaid dual
eligibles. Enrollment is projected to increase by nearly 26 million people by 2020,
80 percent of whom will be adults that are eligible under the new ACA rules
(Office of the Actuary, 2011).
Medicaid programs are state-administered, resulting in significant heterogene-
ity in both the timing of benefit adoption and the generosity of benefits across
states.2 Table 2.1 describes variation in Medicaid coverage of smoking cessation
treatment across Medicaid programs. For each state that has implemented any
form of coverage, the table lists the year coverage began, the type of therapies
initially covered, the number of therapies initially covered, and the number of
therapies covered in 2007.3 Prior to 1996, only Rhode Island’s Medicaid program
offered any coverage for nicotine dependence treatment. In 1996, the Agency for
Health Care Policy and Research’s (AHCPR) published evidence-based guidelines
advising clinicians and health care administrators to identify smokers and conduct
interventions to reduce smoking. The Agency recommended that insurance pur-
chasers (e.g. Medicaid, Medicare, employers) require insurers to cover counseling
2The District of Columbia also has a Medicaid program.
3The last year included in the analysis in this paper is 2007. For a description of how the
sample years were chosen, refer to Section 2.3.
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and other treatments for nicotine addiction. That same year, 18 Medicaid pro-
grams initiated coverage for nicotine dependence treatment. Between 1996 at
2007, an additional 26 Medicaid programs began some form of coverage.
Although most states offered some form of coverage prior to the ACA, Table
2.1 shows that the number of treatments covered varies significantly across states.
Smoking cessation treatments can be categorized into three types: nicotine re-
placement therapies, pharmacotherapies, and counseling. Nicotine replacement
therapies include the nicotine patch, gum, lozenge, nasal spray, and inhaler. Ver-
sions of the patch, gum, and lozenge are available over-the-counter, while nasal
spray and inhalers are available by prescription only. Pharmacotherapies include
bupropion and varenicline, marketed under the names Zyban and Chantix.4 These
prescription medications reduce nicotine cravings and nicotine withdrawal symp-
toms. Lastly, counseling includes group, individual, and telephone counseling.
Until 1996, most states only covered nicotine replacement therapies. Once Zy-
ban entered the market in 1997, nearly every state that offered a nicotine replace-
ment therapy also covered Zyban. Over time, states have increased the number
of covered therapies — the average program initiated with 4.8 therapies and has
expanded to cover 6.5 therapies. Medicaid most commonly covers the nicotine
patch, nicotine gum, and Zyban, while counseling is the least likely treatment to
be covered.
This is the first economics paper to investigate the effect of Medicaid cover-
age of smoking cessation therapies on smoking behavior; however, a handful of
4Zyban was approved by the FDA for smoking cessation therapy in 1997; however, the same
active ingredient is included in some antidepressant medications and was prescribed for smoking
cessation prior to 1997. Chantix entered the market in 2006.
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studies have been completed in the field of public health. These papers employ
a variety of statistical methods on different samples, resulting in a range of es-
timates from very large reductions in smoking to no effect. Petersen, Garrett,
Melvin, and Hartmann (2006) uses Pregnancy Risk Assessment Monitoring Sys-
tem (PRAMS) data to compare the quitting rates during pregnancy of women
in states with Medicaid coverage of smoking cessation to the quitting rates of
pregnant women in states without coverage. Although women in states with cov-
erage are 1.6 times more likely to quit than women in states without coverage,
this difference could be due to state characteristics that are correlated with cov-
erage of SCTs by Medicaid. Land, Warner, Paskowsky, Cammaerts, Wetherell,
Kaufmann, Zhang, Malarcher, Pechacek, and Keithly (2010) use data from the
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System to examine Massachusetts’ implemen-
tation of SCT coverage in 2006, finding that the smoking rate fell by 26 percent
among Medicaid smokers after the reform. Because the timing of SCT coverage
coincided with the state’s health care reform, it is not possible to separate the
effect of SCT coverage from the other effects of health reform. The authors also
describe advertising campaigns, a cigarette tax increase, and a large increase in
the number of Medicaid enrollees that occurred just after the policy change and
acknowledge that their estimates embody the effects of these concurrent events.
Liu (2009, 2010) uses the CPS-TUS to investigate quitting behavior; however,
the sample is conditioned on being a current smoker, which could be affected by
the policy itself. Most recently, Adams, Markowitz, Dietz, and Tong (2013) find
no impact of Medicaid SCT coverage on smoking during pregnancy or after de-
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livery for Medicaid mothers using PRAMS data; however, the authors split the
treatment into three separate variables, making it difficult to identify an effect.
Despite inconclusive evidence on the efficacy of Medicaid coverage for nicotine
dependence treatment, randomized-control trials and quasi-experimental research
suggests that use of smoking cessation therapies is effective at reducing smok-
ing. Clinical trials show that smokers who use nicotine replacement therapies
are 50 to 100 percent more likely to quit than individuals given a placebo, with
similar results for pharmacotherapy (Cummings and Hyland, 2005; Wu, Wilson,
Dimoulas, and Mills, 2006; Stead, Perera, Bullen, Mand, Hartmann-Boyce, Cahill,
and Lancaster, 2012). Increased availability of nicotine replacement therapies (e.g.
lower price or over-the-counter availability) has been found to reduce demand for
cigarettes in economic studies (Keeler, Hu, Keith, Manning, Marciniak, Ong,
and Sung, 2002; Tauras and Chaloupka, 2003; Chaloupka and Tauras, 2004). If
smoking cessation therapies are effective at helping smokers quit, yet there is in-
conclusive evidence that insurance coverage of these therapies lowers the smoking
rate among Medicaid patients, it is possible that Medicaid patients are not using
the benefit. The next section explores this possibility.
2.2.2 Use of Smoking Cessation Therapies by Medicaid
Beneficiaries
Despite the availability of Medicaid smoking cessation benefits in most states
and the relative effectiveness of these therapies at helping smokers quit, take-up
of the benefit is not universally high. Land, Warner, Paskowsky, Cammaerts,
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Wetherell, Kaufmann, Zhang, Malarcher, Pechacek, and Keithly (2010) report
that 37 percent of Massachusetts Medicaid smokers used the benefit within two
years, while only 2 to 4 percent of Medicaid smokers in Arkansas and Wisconsin
used some form of SCT after coverage was implemented (Burns and Fiore, 2001;
Li and Dresler, 2012). One possible explanation for low take-up is that awareness
of the benefit is low. In a survey of Medicaid physicians and patients in two states
that offered coverage for smoking cessation treatment, only 60 percent of doctors
and 36 percent of patients were aware that any coverage was offered (McMenamin,
Halpin, Ibrahim, and Orleans, 2004). A secondary explanation is that smokers
who are trying to quit rarely use smoking cessation therapies. Among individuals
who have unsuccessfully tried to quit smoking during the previous 12 months,
only 16 percent used some form of quitting aid.5
Given the low SCT take-up rate in the Arkansas and Wisconsin Medicaid pro-
grams, it is important to demonstrate that Medicaid coverage increases the use of
smoking cessation therapies before moving on to estimating an effect on smoking
behavior. In order to determine if patients are receiving treatment, I complete
an event study analysis of the use of smoking cessation therapies in 9 states that
initiated coverage during the time period of this study using Medicaid state drug
utilization Data.6 The states included in the analysis are Illinois, Kentucky, Mis-
sissippi, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and West
Virginia.7 This analysis reveals that Medicaid patients are using smoking cessa-
5Source: Author’s calculation from the 2003 CPS-TUS, which included a set of questions
about quitting attempts.
6State drug utilization data are available online from the Center for Medicaid
and Medicaid Services at http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-
Topics/Benefits/Prescription-Drugs/Medicaid-Drug-Programs-Data-and-Resources.html.
7In future iterations of the paper, I plan to extend the analysis to all states that offer coverage.
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tion therapies after the benefit begins. Panel (a) of Figure 1 plots the number of
prescriptions and doses prescribed annually for 2 years before and 4 years after
initiation of Medicaid coverage of smoking cessation therapies. The total num-
ber of prescriptions for these states increases rapidly after coverage is initiated,
growing from approximately 20 thousand in the first year of coverage to over 60
thousand after 4 years. The number of doses increases similarly, growing from 800
thousand to 2.3 million during the same time period. Panel (b) plots the number
of prescriptions and doses per adult Medicaid beneficiary, resulting in 0.40 pre-
scriptions and 13 doses per beneficiary after 4 years. Since initiation of the benefit
caused prescriptions for smoking cessation therapies to increase among Medicaid
patients, it is worthwhile to proceed to estimating the relationship between SCT
coverage and smoking.
2.3 Data
I use data from several sources to estimate the relationship between SCT cov-
erage and smoking behavior. The primary data are the Current Population Survey
Tobacco Use Supplements, which contain information on smoking behavior from
a large, nationally-representative sample of households. These data are combined
with information about Medicaid coverage of smoking cessation therapies pub-
lished in the Center for Disease Control (CDC) Morbidity and Mortality Weekly
Reports. These data, along with additional information on smoking policies, Med-
icaid thresholds, and unemployment rates are described in detail below.
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The time period for the analysis is limited to the years 1998 to 2007. Pre-1998
data are not included in the analysis because the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Act (PRWORA) of 1996 was implemented in July 1997, significantly
altering government benefit eligibility for low-income individuals. Using data from
prior to 1998 could confound the effects of PRWORA with the effects of Medicaid
coverage of smoking cessation treatment. The last year included in the analysis
is 2007, which is dictated by availability of data on parental Medicaid thresholds.
2.3.1 Medicaid Coverage of Smoking Cessation Therapies
Information about Medicaid coverage of smoking cessation therapies is ob-
tained from surveys of state Medicaid programs conducted by the Center for
Health and Public Policy Studies at the University of California at Berkeley
and reported in CDC Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Reports (Halpin, Mc-
Menamin, Orleans, and Husten, 2004; Halpin, McMenamin, Cella, Husten, and
Rosenthal, 2006; Halpin, McMenamin, Cella, Bellows, and Husten, 2008; Mc-
Menamin, Halpin, Bellows, Husten, and Rosenthal, 2009). The surveys include
questions about when any coverage began within a state, which therapies are in-
cluded, as well as which populations are covered. By combining results from these
surveys, I construct a data set containing information on which treatments are
covered each state and year. A summary of these data is provided in Table 2.1.
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2.3.2 Smoking Behavior
Information on smoking behavior is from the Current Population Survey To-
bacco Use Supplements (CPS-TUS) for years 1998 to 2003 and 2006 to 2007.8
The Current Population Survey is a nationally representative, monthly house-
hold survey of labor force participation. The monthly survey often includes sets
of supplemental questions on particular topic such as health, schooling, fertility,
and immigration. Periodically, respondents are asked a series of questions about
smoking and other tobacco-related behaviors as part of the Tobacco Use Supple-
ment, which is sponsored by the National Cancer Institute and the Centers for
Disease Control. The CPS-TUS is a repeated cross section of individuals useful
for describing smoking behavior of Americans over time. Individuals who have
smoked at least 100 cigarettes in their entire life are identified as current or for-
mer smokers and are asked a series of follow-up questions about smoking behavior.
The smoking measures used in this paper are self and proxy reports of smoking
at least some days and smoking every day.
2.3.3 Additional Policy Controls
Both smoking policies and state Medicaid programs were evolving during the
time period of this study, necessitating data to control for changes in these policy
areas over time. To account for more aggressive tobacco-control policies in states, I
use data on cigarette excise taxes and indoor smoking restrictions from the CDC’s
State Tobacco Activities Tracking and Evaluation System. Smoking has a pro-
8The Tobacco Use Supplement was not included in the 2004 or 2005 CPS, hence a two-year
gap in the smoking data.
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cyclical component (Ruhm, 2005); therefore, unemployment rates obtained from
The Bureau of Labor Statistics are used to control for state economic conditions.
Lastly, during this time period state Medicaid programs were expanding benefits
to more children and parents. I control for the increase in the number of adults
on the program with parental Medicaid income eligibility thresholds provided by
Sarah Hamersma and Matthew Kim.9
2.3.4 Estimation Sample
The estimation sample includes parents with a family income below 200 per-
cent of the poverty line who have ever been a smoker. Insurance coverage for
smoking cessation therapy is relevant to individuals who smoke; therefore, I first
limit the sample to current and former smokers defined as having smoked at least
100 cigarettes during their lifetime. Next, I keep respondents who are likely to
be eligible for Medicaid by selecting low-income adults who have children.10 By
choosing the sample in this way, I am focusing the analysis on individuals are likely
to be affected by changes in Medicaid coverage for smoking cessation therapy.
Table 2.2 reports summary statistics for the sample, which includes 37,281
individuals. The average respondent is 35 years old, the sample is 54 percent
female, 77 percent are married or cohabiting, and the average respondent has
2 children. As a result of sampling low-income individuals, the average family
9For more information about the parental eligibility thresholds used in this paper, see
Hamersma and Kim (2009, 2013).
10I limit the sample to parents with 1 to 5 children because I am only able to match parental
Medicaid thresholds to these individuals.
45
Chapter 2. Medicaid Coverage of Smoking Cessation Treatment and Smoking
income is $19,006 per year and most individuals have a high school education or
less.
The last two rows of Table 2.2 report information on the two measures of
smoking behavior used in the paper. Seventy-one percent of the sample reports
currently being a smoker; this variable takes a value of 1 if the respondent re-
ports smoking on at least some days and zero otherwise. Thus, 29 percent of the
sample is comprised of individuals who are former smokers. Fifty-eight percent
of respondents smoke every day; this variable takes a value of 1 if the respondent
reports smoking every day and zero otherwise.
2.4 Estimation Strategy
I use the roll-out of Medicaid smoking cessation coverage across states over
time as a natural experiment to test the effectiveness of coverage at reducing
smoking. When estimating the relationship between a policy variable and an
outcome of interest, the econometrician’s concern is that an omitted variable
affecting both the policy variable and the outcome will bias the estimates. In order
to account for the possibility of omitted variables bias, I control for both time-
varying and time-invariant factors using the following linear probability model:11
Smokeist = β0 + β1Coveredst +Xiα +Wstγ + Lstψ + δs + λt + pirt + εist
11I have also estimated the equation using a probit model, and the results are similar to
the linear probability model. Linear probability model results in Tables 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 are
replicated in Tables B.2, B.3, and B.4 using a probit specification.
46
Chapter 2. Medicaid Coverage of Smoking Cessation Treatment and Smoking
where Smokeist is a measure of smoking behavior of individual i living in state
s in year t. Coveredst is an indicator variable that is 1 in year t if state s’s
Medicaid program covers smoking cessation treatment and zero otherwise. The
coefficient of interest is β1, which captures the effect of initiating Medicaid smoking
cessation coverage on smoking behavior. Xi is a vector of individual characteristics
including age, race, education, marital/cohabitation status, family income, and
number of children. Age is controlled for using dummy variables for the 7 year age
category of 18 to 24 years old and 5 year age categories for ages between 25 and 64
years old. Race, education, marital/cohabitation status, and income categories
are also entered as dummy variables to allow as much flexibility as possible in
the estimating equation. The elements of Xi control for differences in smoking
behavior across demographic subgroups.
The vector Wst includes state and time-specific characteristics including the
state parental Medicaid threshold, the tax per pack of cigarettes, the number of
indoor smoking restrictions, and the state unemployment rate. During this time
period, most state Medicaid programs repeatedly increased the eligibility thresh-
olds for parents, expanding coverage to more parents over time. It is important
to include Medicaid thresholds in the regression because expanding Medicaid el-
igibility could have an independent effect on smoking behavior by changing the
composition of the Medicaid population. Parental Medicaid thresholds are merged
to each individual based on state, month, and family size. Thus, I control for the
individual-specific Medicaid threshold within a state and month. Cigarette taxes
and indoor smoking restrictions (e.g. schools, workplaces, restaurants, bars, multi-
unit housing, etc.) also changed greatly during the period of this study and not
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controlling for these policies could lead to biased estimates of β1. The final com-
ponent of Wst is the unemployment rate, which controls for the general economic
climate.
Lastly, state fixed effects (δs) absorb time-invariant state features and year
fixed effects (λt) control for changes in the smoking rate at a national level over
time. State-specific time trends (Lst) model state trajectories in smoking behavior
and census region-year fixed effects (pirt) capture regional time trends as flexibly as
possible. Standard errors are clustered at the state level to account for correlation
in the error term across individuals living in the same state.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Main Estimates
To examine the relationship between Medicaid coverage of smoking cessation
therapies and smoking behavior, I begin with an event study analysis of the dy-
namics of smoking before and after Medicaid coverage of SCTs. Figure 2.2 presents
the smoking rate before and after coverage, relative to the level of smoking in the
year coverage began. The level of smoking in a given year is the coefficient from
a regression of a dichotomous smoking indicator on dummy variables for the four
years before and the 6 years after coverage began in a state, with the year cov-
erage began as the omitted category in the regression. The regression includes
all controls included in columns (3) and (6) of Table 2.3, discussed below.12 In
12Although a balanced panel of states is ideal for an event study, analysis, the two-year gap
in the CPS-TUS during 2004 and 2005 makes it impossible to create a balanced panel of states
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Figure 2.2, the solid line represents the point estimate on smoking and the dashed
lines indicate the 95 percent confidence interval of the smoking estimate. The
point estimates for the years prior to Medicaid coverage of smoking cessation
treatment bounce above and below zero, and are all indistinguishable from zero.
This is reassuring because it suggests that the regression specification adequately
controls for the time trend in smoking prior to the policy change. Immediately
after coverage begins, the smoking rate falls by approximately 2.5 percentage
points. The reduction in smoking is constant during the first 4 years after the
program initiates, suggesting that on average, Medicaid coverage of SCTs has an
immediate effect on smoking behavior rather than taking several years to reduce
smoking.
Table 2.3 presents results from regressions on two measures of smoking behav-
ior: smoke and smoke every day. These regressions are estimated using the equa-
tion in Section 2.4 and I include three specifications for each dependent variable.
The coefficient shown in columns (1) and (4) is from a regression that includes
state fixed effects, year fixed effects, region by year fixed effects, and state linear
time trends. This specification assumes that Medicaid coverage of smoking ces-
sation therapy is exogenous once time-invariant state characteristics, a national
trend in smoking, shocks specific to a region and year, and state-specific trends in
smoking over time are accounted for. Columns (2) and (5) add controls for indi-
vidual characteristics in order to account for variation in smoking behavior across
demographic characteristics. Individual controls include age, age squared, race,
education, marital/cohabitation status, family income, and number of children.
with at least 2 pre-period years and more than 3 post-period years. Therefore, the results shown
in Figure 2.2 are from an unbalanced panel of states.
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Lastly, columns (3) and (6) add state-specific, time-varying controls. These con-
trols include the parental Medicaid threshold, the cigarette excise tax, the number
of indoor smoking restrictions, and the unemployment rate.
The first three columns of Table 2.3 present estimates of the introduction of
Medicaid coverage on smoking at least some days. The estimate in column (1) is
interpreted as Medicaid coverage of SCT causing a 5.22 percentage point reduction
in smoking. The magnitude attenuates slightly to 4.68 percentage points when
person-specific controls are added in column (2). The estimate is unchanged
after adding state-specific controls in column (3), implying that coverage reduces
smoking by 4.33 percentage points among low-income parents who are current or
former smokers. The mean smoking rate is 71 percent for this group, resulting in
more than a 6 percent reduction in the smoking rate.
Columns (4) to (6) show the coefficients from regressions of smoking every day,
which reveals the effects of SCT coverage on intense smokers. Everyday smok-
ers comprise 58 percent of the overall sample and 82 percent of the smokers in
the sample. Smoking every day falls by over 3 percentage points in columns (4)
and (5); however, adding time-varying state controls roughly halves the estimate
and removes its significance in column (6). This less robust finding for everyday
smokers suggests that the decline in smoking is only partially driven by every-
day smokers and a portion of the decline in smoking is due to individuals who
previously smoked only some days.
In summary, there is clear evidence that introduction of insurance coverage
for smoking cessation therapies reduces smoking on the extensive margin, but the
effect on everyday smokers is less robust. An event study analysis demonstrates
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that on average the reduction in smoking occurs immediately after policy intro-
duction, rather than taking a few years to become effective. The remainder of the
paper presents estimates using the preferred specification in columns (3) and (6)
of Table 2.3 because it controls for the gamut of individual and state features.
2.5.2 Heterogeneity of Effects
Effectively designing policy requires knowledge of which groups of people re-
spond to a particular intervention. Therefore, I re-estimate the model for several
subgroups of interest in Table 2.4. For each subgroup listed in the leftmost col-
umn of the table, I present the change in smoking and smoking every day following
initiation of Medicaid coverage of smoking cessation therapies. Each coefficient is
from a separate regression, standard errors are given in parenthesis, and the mean
of the dependent variable for each subgroup is given in brackets.
This exercise reveals that the groups who are responsive to the policy change
are those that are most likely to be on Medicaid insurance. I first estimate the
regression equation separately by gender, finding that Medicaid coverage of SCTs
results in women reducing smoking by 5.96 percentage points. On a mean smoking
rate of 72 percent, this is a 8 percent reduction in smoking among sample females.
Men, on the other hand, do not reduce smoking in response to Medicaid coverage
of smoking cessation therapies. The lack of an effect for men can reflect two
possibilities; either the policy intervention is indeed ineffective for men, or most
men in the sample are not eligible for Medicaid. Without knowing the Medicaid
status of individuals in the sample, it is not possible to discern which explanation
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is correct.13 Expansion of Medicaid coverage that includes smoking cessation
treatment to adults without children as part of the ACA creates an opportunity
to evaluate the policy’s effect on men using publicly-available data. For both men
and women, there is no statistically significant effect on smoking everyday.
Moving down the table, the policy has the largest effect on individuals with
the lowest education level. Again, individuals in this group are most likely to be
eligible for Medicaid. Among those with less than a high school education, Medi-
caid coverage of smoking cessation therapies reduces smoking by 13.4 percentage
points. This is a very large 17 percent reduction in the extensive margin of smok-
ing behavior. Smoking every day falls by 10.5 percentage points, which is also a
17 percent reduction for everyday smokers. The results for the largest education
category - high school education - are puzzling. The coefficients on smoking and
smoking everyday are both positive, and the latter is statistically significant.14
Among the sample of low-income parents at risk for smoking with at least some
college, the policy reduces smoking by 7.81 percentage points. The point estimate
is similar for smoking every day, but does not quite reach statistical significance.
Lastly, Medicaid coverage of smoking cessation therapies is effective at reduc-
ing smoking for individuals below 100 percent of the federal poverty line. This
13Medicaid coverage during the previous year is asked in the March interview of the CPS.
None of the Tobacco Use Supplements are conducted in March, meaning that individuals would
have to be matched across months in order to obtain Medicaid status, causing a reduction in the
sample size. A matched sample from the CPS-TUS would not be suitable for analysis because
of the smaller number of observations and because the November 2001 and 2003 supplements
would be dropped since the individuals in those supplements are not interviewed in March.
14This perverse effect may be related to the high smoking rate of GED holders, whom I
cannot differentiate from high school graduates in the sample. The smoking rates for high
school dropouts, GED holders, and high school graduates are approximately 25 percent, 45
percent, and 23 percent respectively.
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finding is also consistent with the poorest individuals being more likely to have
Medicaid coverage.
Next, I investigate heterogeneity in smoking reduction by the age of the chil-
dren in the household. Naturally, reducing smoking in households with children
is a priority because of the health effects of secondhand smoke and the intergener-
ational correlation in smoking behavior. Children exposed to secondhand smoke
may suffer from additional health problems such as increased risk of illness, more
frequent and severe asthma attacks, and more ear infections (Surgeon General,
2006). Children who are young when a parent quits smoking benefit from more
years without secondhand smoke exposure. Moreover, smoking during pregnancy
increases health risk for both the infant and the mother in the form of complica-
tions such as miscarriage, membrane ruptures, birth defects, and still-birth (Tong,
Jones, Dietz, D’Angelo, and Bombard, 2009). Women who smoke during preg-
nancy have lower birth weight babies on average and are at a greater risk for
having an infant classified as low birth weight (Sexton and Hebel, 1984; Almond,
Chay, and Lee, 2005; Lien and Evans, 2005).
Table 2.5 presents estimates from a regression specification that allows for
separate effects of Medicaid coverage of smoking cessation therapy by age of the
youngest child in the household. This regression interacts the indicator variable
for Medicaid coverage of SCTs with a dummy variable for the age category of
the youngest child in the household. Youngest children are categorized into three
age groups: 0 to 1 years old, 2 to 5 years old, and 6 to 17 years old. The
first row of Table 2.5 shows that Medicaid coverage of smoking cessation therapy
reduces smoking by 5.07 percentage points and reduces smoking every day by 5.65
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percentage points for parents whose youngest child is an infant. The magnitude of
the effect is much smaller and insignificant for parents of young children between
the ages of 2 and 5 years old at -1.21 and -2.15 percentage points for smoking and
smoking every day, respectively. For parents of older children, the effect on both
measures of smoking behavior is zero.15
2.5.3 Generosity of Coverage
As shown in Table 2.1, there is diversity in number of smoking cessation treat-
ments covered by Medicaid across states. This heterogeneity, combined with the
expansion of coverage to more therapies over time within many states creates an
opportunity to test whether or not increasing the number of therapies covered
improves outcomes. This exercise is useful because advocacy groups are calling
for more explicit language requiring coverage of all smoking cessation therapies in
the Affordable Care Act.
Under the ACA, drugs used to promote smoking cessation are non-excludable
from coverage by insurers. However, the American Lung Association, the Amer-
ican Cancer Society Cancer Action Network, and the Partnership for Prevention
have issued a white paper stating that “simply requiring health plans to cover ‘to-
bacco cessation’ is not enough...[we] urge the department of Health and Human
Services to include a comprehensive cessation benefit” in the ACA (Cancer Ac-
tion Network, American Lung Association, and Partnership for Prevention, 2011).
This request for comprehensive coverage of all available treatments is based on
15In results not shown, heterogeneous effects by number of children in the household are
estimated. The effect does not vary by the number of children in a household, rather, the age
of the most recent child appears to be more relevant to quitting smoking.
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the idea that offering a variety of options for smokers will increase the probability
of successfully quit smoking.
Table 2.6 presents results from a regression specification that includes an indi-
cator variable for any SCT coverage and a second indicator variable for coverage
of 7 or more therapies in a given year. Since 1998, the average program initiated
coverage with 4.7 therapies covered and expands coverage by almost 2 therapies
over time. The regression is specified to differentiate between the average pro-
gram offering somewhere between 4 and 6 treatments and a generous program
offering at least 7 therapies. For the 7 states that initiate coverage with at least 7
therapies, both dummy variables will turn on when the program begins. For the
8 states that initiate coverage with less than 7 therapies and expand coverage to
include more than 7, only the first dummy will turn on initially. Once coverage is
expanded to more than 7 therapies, the second dummy will also turn on to capture
the additional effect on smoking behavior from expanding generosity. The first
row of the table gives the effect of having any SCT coverage and the coefficient
in the second row gives the effect of having 7 or more therapies available.
Column (1) presents the results on the extensive margin of smoking and shows
that adding more therapies does increase the likelihood that an individual quits.
Initiating any smoking cessation coverage causes a 3.78 percentage point reduction
in smoking. Expanding coverage to 7 or more therapies adds a marginal reduction
of 2.57 percentage points. No statistically significant effects for smoking every day
are detectable. This finding is evidence supporting the notion that more treatment
options increase the efficacy of insurance coverage for smoking cessation treatment.
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2.6 Placebo Checks
A negative relationship between Medicaid SCT coverage and smoking could be
observed if the econometric model does not adequately control for the downward
trend in smoking. If the decline in smoking is fully captured in the model, then
estimating the regression equation for individuals who are not affected by Medicaid
SCT coverage should produce no effect of SCT coverage on smoking.
Table 2.7 presents results from re-estimating the regressions for groups whose
smoking behavior should be unaffected by the policy changes because they are
ineligible for Medicaid. In Panel A of Table 7, I estimate the equation on a
sample of adults with no children. The coefficients are precise zeros. In Panel
B, the estimation sample includes parents with annual family incomes above 200
percent of the federal poverty level. Again, these estimates are zeros. This zero
effect on individuals that are unlikely to be affected by the policy suggests that
the effect of Medicaid SCT coverage is identified in the model, reinforcing the
paper’s main conclusion that Medicaid coverage of smoking cessation treatment
is an effective means for reducing smoking among the Medicaid population.
2.7 Discussion
Reducing smoking remains a primary goal of public health policy, as evidenced
in the Affordable Care Act’s mandate that health insurers cover smoking cessation
treatment. Using variation in the timing of introduction of Medicaid coverage for
smoking cessation therapies, this paper demonstrates that reducing the cost of
cigarette substitutes by offering insurance coverage of smoking cessation therapies
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is effective at curbing smoking. Medicaid coverage reduces smoking by 6 percent
among a sample of low-income parents who are current or former smokers, an effect
that translates to a 21 percent reduction in smoking among Medicaid-eligible
smokers. This effect is concentrated on mothers with small children, not only
improving the health of the mother but also potentially reducing secondhand
smoke exposure of her children. Using a unique dataset of Medicaid claims for
smoking cessation therapies, I also document significant heterogeneity in use of
the benefit across states. These results suggest that while insurance coverage
of smoking cessation treatment under the ACA will likely improve the smoking
rate, smokers may need to be encouraged to utilize smoking cessation therapies
to maximize the impact of the policy.
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Figure 2.1: Medicaid Claims for Smoking Cessation Therapies
(a) Total Prescriptions and Doses (b) Prescriptions and Doses per Adult Beneficiary
Note: Graphs use Medicaid claims data to plot the number of prescriptions and doses of smoking
cessation therapies dispensed for 9 states for two years before and four years after Medicaid
coverage of nicotine dependence treatment. The solid line indicates the number of prescriptions
and the dashed line indicates the number of doses. Panel (a) presents the total number of
prescriptions and doses. Panel (b) presents the number of prescriptions and doses per adult
Medicaid beneficiary. The nine states included in the data are Illinois, Kentucky, Mississippi,
Nebraska, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia.
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Figure 2.2: Event Study of Smoking Rates Before and After Coverage Initiates
Note: Graph shows the results of an event study analysis using CPS-TUS data. The solid line
indicates the point estimate of the smoking rate relative to the rate in year 0, when Medi-
caid coverage of smoking cessation treatment begins. The dashed lines indicate the 95 percent
confidence interval of the estimate.
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Table 2.1: Medicaid Coverage of Smoking Cessation Therapies
Number of Therapies Covered in 2007
State
Year Any Coverage 
Began Nicotine Replacement1 Pharmacotherapy2 Counseling3 Total Total
Rhode Island 1994 0 0 2 2 7
California 1996 3 0 0 3 7
Colorado 1996 3 0 0 3 9
Delaware 1996 3 0 0 3 7
District of Columbia 1996 1 0 0 1 6
Louisiana 1996 1 0 0 1 6
Maine 1996 4 0 0 4 8
Maryland 1996 3 0 0 3 6
Minnesota 1996 1 0 2 3 9
Montana 1996 2 0 0 2 7
Nevada 1996 3 0 0 3 7
New Hampshire 1996 3 0 0 3 9
New Jersey 1996 0 1 0 1 10
New Mexico 1996 3 0 0 3 9
North Carolina 1996 1 0 0 1 7
North Dakota 1996 2 0 0 2 5
Texas 1996 3 0 0 3 6
Virginia 1996 3 0 0 3 9
Wisconsin 1996 2 0 0 2 6
Florida 1997 0 0 2 2 6
Michigan 1997 2 1 0 3 6
Ohio 1998 3 1 0 4 7
Oregon 1998 4 1 3 8 10
Arkansas 1999 0 1 0 1 5
Hawaii 1999 2 1 0 3 7
Indiana 1999 4 1 2 7 9
Kansas 1999 1 1 2 4 5
New York 1999 2 1 0 3 8
Oklahoma 1999 2 1 0 3 8
Vermont 1999 4 1 0 5 7
Illinois 2000 4 1 0 5 7
West Virginia 2000 4 1 2 7 7
Kentucky 2001 0 0 2 2 3
Mississippi 2001 4 1 0 5 9
South Dakota 2001 0 1 0 1 2
Utah 2001 5 2 3 10 10
Nebraska 2002 0 0 1 1 1
Pennsylvania 2002 4 1 2 7 9
Washington 2002 0 0 1 1 2
South Carolina 2004 5 1 0 6 7
Alaska 2006 5 2 1 8 8
Massachusetts 2006 5 2 2 9 9
Idaho 2007 5 1 0 6 6
Iowa 2007 2 1 0 3 3
Wyoming 2007 3 2 2 7 7
Program start dates and therapies covered are from CDC Mortality and Morbidity Weekly Reports.
1Nicotine replacement therapies include the nicotine patch, gum, inhaler, lozenge, and nasal spray. 
2Pharmacotherapy include Zyban and Chantix. Zyban became available in 1997 and Chantix was released in 2006.
3Counseling includes group, individual, and telephone counseling.
Number of Therapies Initially Covered
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics for Low-Income Parents Who Have Smoked at
Least 100 Cigarettes
Mean SD
Age 35.40 (9.17)
Female 0.54 (0.50)
Married 0.60 (0.49)
Cohabiting 0.17 (0.37)
Single 0.23 (0.42)
# Children 1.94 (0.91)
Family Income ($) 19,006 (9863)
Education
Less than High School 0.28 (0.45)
High School 0.43 (0.50)
Some College 0.24 (0.43)
College or More 0.05 (0.21)
Race
White 0.65 (0.48)
Black 0.14 (0.35)
Hispanic 0.16 (0.37)
Asian/Pacific Islander 0.02 (0.14)
Other 0.02 (0.14)
State Controls
Tax Per Pack ($) 0.59 (0.46)
Number of Indoor Smoking Restrictions 3.65 (2.46)
Unemployment Rate 4.86 (1.08)
Parental Medicaid Threshold1 0.74 (0.43)
Outcome Variables
Smoke 0.71 (0.46)
Smoke Every Day 0.58 (0.49)
N 37,281
Note: Data are the Current Population Survey Tobacco Use 
Supplement (CPS-TUS) for years 1998 to 2003, and 2006 to 2007. 
Sample includes individuals who have smoked at least 100 cigarettes 
in the past, have between 1 and 5 children, and have annual family 
income below 200% of the poverty line. Arizona is excluded from the 
sample due to lack of information about the state's Medicaid smoking 
cessation treatment coverage.
1Parental Medicaid thresholds are reported as a percentage of the 
federal poverty line.
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Table 2.3: Effect of Medicaid Smoking Cessation Therapy Coverage on Smoking
Behavior
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Smoke Smoke Smoke
Smoke 
Every Day
Smoke 
Every Day
Smoke 
Every Day
Smoking Cessation Covered -0.0522*** -0.0468*** -0.0433*** -0.0378*** -0.0336** -0.0195
(0.0163) (0.0146) (0.0155) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0143)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.706 0.706 0.706 0.583 0.583 0.583
State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
RegionxYear FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
State Linear Trends YES YES YES YES YES YES
Individual Controls NO YES YES NO YES YES
State Controls NO NO YES NO NO YES
Observations 37,281 37,281 37,281 37,281 37,281 37,281
Note: The table shows coefficients from linear regressions of smoking behavior on a dummy variable for Medicaid 
coverage of smoking cessation therapies using the CPS-TUS. The sample includes parents with 1 to 5 children and family 
income below 200% of the poverty line. Individual controls include gender, age categories, education dummies, family 
income dummies, an indicator variable for married/cohabiting, and the number of children. State controls include the 
parental Medicaid threshold as a percentage of the poverty line, the unemployment rate, the cigarette tax per pack, and the 
number of indoor smoking restrictions. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.4: Effect of Medicaid Smoking Cessation Therapy Coverage on Smoking
Behavior by Demographic Characteristics
(1) (2)
Smoke Smoke Every Day
Gender
Female -0.0596*** -0.0252
[n=21,078] (0.0150) (0.0177)
[0.719] [0.598]
Male -0.0194 -0.0104
[n=16,203] (0.0264) (0.0256)
[0.692] [0.566]
Education
Less than High School Education -0.134*** -0.105***
[n=9,688] (0.0282) (0.0310)
[0.756] [0.624]
High School Education 0.0360 0.0551**
[n=16,317] (0.0228) (0.0230)
[0.730] [0.613]
Some College or More -0.0781** -0.0579
[n=11,276] (0.0356) (0.0378)
[0.621] [0.499]
Income
Income <100% FPL -0.0780*** -0.0520
[n=14,638] (0.0283) (0.0312)
[0.763] [0.624]
Income ≥100% FPL -0.0155 0.00187
[n=22,643] (0.0237) (0.0213)
[0.669] [0.557]
State FE YES YES
Year FE YES YES
RegionxYear FE YES YES
State Linear Trends YES YES
Individual Controls YES YES
State Controls YES YES
Note: The table shows coefficients from linear regressions of smoking behavior on a 
dummy variable for Medicaid coverage of smoking cessation therapies using the CPS-TUS. 
Each cell includes the coefficient of interest from a separate regression. The sample 
includes parents with 1 to 5 children and family income below 200% of the poverty line. 
Individual controls include gende, age categories, education dummies,  family income 
dummies, an indicator variable for married/cohabiting, and the number of children. State 
controls include the parental Medicaid threshold as a percentage of the poverty line, the 
unemployment rate, the cigarette tax per pack, and the number of indoor smoking 
restrictions. Standard errors are in parentheses and the mean of the dependent variable is in 
brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.5: Effect of Medicaid Smoking Cessation Therapy Coverage by Age of
Youngest Child
(1) (2)
Smoke
Smoke Every 
Day
Smoking Cessation Covered*Youngest Child 0 to 1 -0.0507*** -0.0565***
(0.0122) (0.0110)
Smoking Cessation Covered*Youngest Child 2 to 5 -0.0121 -0.0215
(0.0119) (0.0155)
Smoking Cessation Covered*Youngest Child 6 to 17 -0.00362 0.00277
(0.0108) (0.00896)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.706 0.583
State FE YES YES
Year FE YES YES
RegionxYear FE YES YES
State Linear Trends YES YES
Individual Controls YES YES
State Controls YES YES
Observations 37,281 37,281
Note: The table shows coefficients from linear regressions of smoking behavior on a dummy 
variable set equal to 1 if Medicad covers smoking cessation therapy interacted with a dummy 
variables for the age of the youngest child in the household.  The sample includes parents with 
1 to 5 children and family income below 200% of the poverty line. Individual controls include 
gender, age categories, education dummies,  family income dummies, an indicator variable for 
married/cohabiting, and the number of children. State controls include the parental Medicaid 
threshold as a percentage of the poverty line, the unemployment rate, the cigarette tax per pack, 
and the number of indoor smoking restrictions. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.6: Effect of Number of Smoking Cessation Therapies Covered by Medicaid
on Smoking Behavior
(1) (2)
Smoke Smoke Every Day
Smoking Cessation Coverage -0.0378** -0.0199
(0.0165) (0.0144)
Number of Therapies ≥ 7 -0.0257* 0.00201
(0.0149) (0.0163)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.706 0.583
State FE YES YES
Year FE YES YES
RegionxYear FE YES YES
State Linear Trends YES YES
Individual Controls YES YES
State Controls YES YES
Observations 37,281 37,281
Note: The table shows coefficients from linear regressions of smoking behavior on a dummy variable set 
equal to 1 if Medicad covers smoking cessation therapy and a second variable containing the number of 
therapies covered.  The sample includes parents with 1 to 5 children and family income below 200% of 
the poverty line. Individual controls include gender, age categories, education dummies, family income 
dummies, an indicator variable for married/cohabiting, and the number of children. State controls include 
the parental Medicaid threshold as a percentage of the poverty line, the unemployment rate, the cigarette 
tax per pack, and the number of indoor smoking restrictions. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.7: Effect of Number of Smoking Cessation Therapies Covered by Medicaid
on Smoking Behavior
(1) (2)
Smoke Smoke Every Day
Smoking Cessation Covered -0.00142 0.000382
(0.00980) (0.0106)
Smoking Cessation Covered -0.00868 -0.00944
(0.0193) (0.0201)
State FE YES YES
Year FE YES YES
RegionxYear FE YES YES
State Linear Trends YES YES
Individual Controls YES YES
State Controls YES YES
Panel A: Adults with No Children
Panel B: Parents with Family Income >200% of Federal Poverty Line
Note: The table shows coefficients from linear regressions of smoking behavior 
on a dummy variable for Medicaid coverage of smoking cessation therapies using 
the CPS-TUS.  The sample in Panel A includes adults age 18 to 64 with no 
children. The sample in Panel B includes parents with family income above 200 
percent of the federal poverty line. Individual controls include gender, age 
categories, education dummies, family income dummies, an indicator variable for 
married/cohabiting, and the number of children. State controls include the 
parental Medicaid threshold as a percentage of the poverty line, the 
unemployment rate, the cigarette tax per pack, and the number of indoor smoking 
restrictions. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Chapter 3
Family Structure and the Gender
Gap in ADHD Diagnosis
3.1 Introduction
Attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is the most common neu-
robehavioral disorder among America’s youth (Feldman and Reiff, 2014), impos-
ing significant short and long-run costs on sufferers.1 Children with symptoms of
ADHD have lower grades, higher special education enrollment, higher incidence of
learning disabilities, higher delinquency, and lower completed education(Mayes,
Calhoun, and Crowell, 2000; Currie and Stabile, 2006; Fletcher and Wolfe, 2008,
2009). In adulthood, individuals who have ever been diagnosed with ADHD have
lower levels of employment, earn less, and are more likely to receive social assis-
1ADHD is a developmental disorder characterized by inability to focus, hyperactivity, impul-
sivity, and difficulty paying attention (National Institute of Mental Health 2012). The American
Psychiatric Associations diagnostic criteria for ADHD requires that a child present at least six
symptoms of hyperactivity or inattention. Several symptoms must be present before age 12,
symptoms must be present in two or more settings (e.g. home and school), and must interfere
with social, academic, or occupational functioning. Appendix A includes the American Psy-
chiatric Associations criteria for ADHD diagnosis including the list of possible symptoms that
must be displayed.
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tance (Fletcher, 2014). The number of children diagnosed with ADHD increased
by 42 percent between 2003 and 2011, by which time 11 percent of children had
been diagnosed with the disorder (VIsser, Danielson, Bitsko, Holbrook, Kogan,
Ghandour, Perou, and Blumberg, 2014).
Rates of ADHD vary dramatically by geography, race, income, and gender,
suggesting that diagnosis is influenced by factors other than just the underlying
prevalence of the disorder. For example, nearly 19 percent of children in Ken-
tucky have received an ADHD diagnosis compared to only 6 percent in Nevada,
low income children have higher rates of diagnosis, and boys are twice as likely as
girls to have ADHD (Akinbami, Liu, Pator, and Reuben, 2011). Since diagnosis
of ADHD in childhood relies on parent and teacher reports of behavior and is in-
herently subjective, researchers have attempted to identify factors related to over-
and/or under-diagnosis of the disorder. For example, Elder and Lubotsky (2009),
Elder (2010), and Evans, Morrill, and Parente (2010) show that children who are
young for their grade are more likely to be diagnosed with ADHD than children
who are very similarly aged but missed the entry cutoff. Fulton, Hinshaw, Levine,
Stone, Brown, and Modrek (2009) show that physician supply is correlated with
the prevalence of ADHD, but find no relationship between a states educational
policies and ADHD prevalence. While these large gaps across demographic and
socioeconomic groups seem unlikely to arise entirely from differences in the true
underlying prevalence, their origins remain largely unexplained.
We provide evidence that family structure is an important factor influencing
ADHD diagnosis, especially for boys. Using data from the National Health Inter-
view Survey from 1998 to 2012, we show that children in non-traditional families
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are more likely to be diagnosed with ADHD. We compare the gender gap in ADHD
diagnosis across traditional, single parent, and blended families, finding that the
negative impact of a non-traditional family structure is much larger for boys.2
The male-female gap in ADHD is approximately twice as large in non-traditional
families. Boys in traditional families are 5.5 percentage points more likely to be
diagnosed with ADHD than girls in traditional families. This gap is 9.0 percentage
points in single parent households and 11.2 percentage points in blended house-
holds. The existence of a gender gap in ADHD diagnosis across all family types
is consistent with a higher prevalence among boys; however, the much larger gap
in non-traditional families suggests that boys diagnosis is especially impacted by
the type of household they live in.
These results are consistent with the recent findings of Bertrand and Pan
(2013). They show that family structure is an important determinant of the
gender gap in disruptive behavior. They find that the male-female gap in exter-
nalizing behavior is nearly twice as large in single mother households compared
to traditional households, which is similar to the magnitude of the ADHD gap
estimated in this paper. Our results demonstrate that these externalizing gender
gaps are not simply behavioral, but also extend to diagnosis of a psychological
disorder.
Our findings are part of a growing literature exploring male vulnerability dur-
ing childhood and whether this might be part of the reason that disadvantaged
2Interpretation of our findings as causal relies on the assumption that child gender is essen-
tially random within family structure; however, a small relationship does exist between child
gender and family structure. The magnitude of the excess gap in ADHD diagnosis is too large
to be explained by selection into family structure by child gender. We discuss the literature
relating family structure to child gender in Section 2.
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boys fare poorly educationally and in the labor market. Since ADHD adversely ef-
fects cognitive and non-cognitive development, excess male-female gaps in ADHD
rates for non-traditional families are consistent with worse adult outcomes for boys
from disadvantaged backgrounds.3 But from what does the gap arise? Lundberg,
Pabilonia, and Ward-Batts (2007) and Bertrand and Pan (2013) show that single
mothers spend less time with male children, while boys in two-parent households
receive the same or more parental time investment than girls. However, Bertrand
and Pan (2013) find that differences in parental time investment explain only a
small portion of the gender gap in externalizing behavior. Alternatively, Gershon
and Gershon (2002) show that girls with ADHD more frequently have internalizing
symptoms, and manifest fewer symptoms overall, while boys more often have hy-
peractive and externalizing symptoms. It is certainly possible that non-traditional
families are less able to cope with boys ADHD symptoms, which are more likely
to be disruptive due to their externalizing nature, and are therefore more likely
to seek help and obtain a diagnosis. While there is still a lot to learn about why
boys fare relatively worse than girls in non-traditional families, ADHD is known to
affect short and long-run outcomes and the results in this paper clearly document
huge excess male-female gaps in ADHD in non-traditional families.
3See Heckman and Rubinstein (2001), Jacob (2002), Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006),
Becker, Hubbard, and Murphy (2010), and Chetty, Friedman, Saez, Whitmore Schanzenbach,
and Yagan (2011)
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3.2 Data
We use data from the 1998 to 2012 National Health Interview Survey (NHIS).
The NHIS is a cross-sectional, annual household survey that collects information
on health conditions, health care use, and detailed demographic characteristics
from a nationally representative sample. We draw on parental reports of child
health for one child in the household from the Sample Child Supplement. Our
main outcome variable is a parental report of whether the sample child has ever
been diagnosed with ADHD. In addition to ADHD diagnosis, we also use parental
reports of child behavior including whether the child has a good attention span,
is worried, is unhappy, or has difficulties with emotions, concentration, behavior,
or getting along with others.4 Lastly, we use diagnoses of cognitive and physi-
cal health including whether the child has learning or developmental disabilities,
hearing problems, ear infections, asthma, and food allergies.
The sample includes 99,148 children aged 5 to 16 who live with at least one
biological or adoptive parent. Children are classified as belonging to a traditional
family if they live with both biological parents or two adoptive parents, a single
parent family if there is only one parent in the household (either biological or
adoptive), and a blended family if the household contains one biological/adoptive
parent who is cohabiting with a non-biological parent in the household. For ex-
4The NHIS records parental reports of good attention span, child worry, and child unhap-
piness on a three point scale of not true, somewhat true, and certainly true. We recode these
variables to 1 if the parent answers somewhat or certainly true and zero otherwise. The variable
for difficulties in emotions, concentration, behavior, or being able to get along with others is
coded as 0 if there are no difficulties or minor difficulties and 1 if the difficulties are definite or
severe.
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ample, a child living in a household with a biological mother and a step-father or
adoptive father would be classified as living in a blended family.5
Our primary interest is comparing the gender gap in ADHD diagnosis across
traditional, single parent, and blended families. This analysis is complicated by
the fact that family structure is not randomly assigned. Of particular concern
is the possibility that child gender influences family structure. In fact, previous
research shows that having a male child slightly increases the probability that
unwed parents marry and that married parents remain married (Katzev, Warner,
and Acock, 1994; Mott, 1994; Lundberg and Rose, 2003; Bedard and Deschenes,
2005; Dahl and Moretti, 2008). However, Morgan and Pollard (2003) show that the
correlation between child gender and subsequent divorce is gone by 1994 in Current
Population Survey data. And, Lundberg, McLanahan, and Rose (2007) find that
the association between child gender and parental living arrangements disappears
by the time the child is one year old using a sample of low-income parents from the
Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study. Overall, the evidence suggests that
by the 2000s (the time period of our data), the impact of child gender on family
structure is likely at most very small. As will be discussed further in Section 4,
this slight selection effect into family structure by child gender is far too small to
explain the 3.5-5.5 percentage point excess ADHD gender gaps we estimate for
non-traditional family structures.
The demographic and socioeconomic summary statistics by child gender and
family structure presented in 3.1 are also consistent with there being very limited
5In the NHIS, family structure is a snapshot of the household at the time of the interview. The
ADHD variable is measured as ever having been diagnosed. No information is collected about
the timing of an ADHD diagnosis, marriages, separations, or divorces, making it impossible to
determine whether the diagnosis was made before or after a change in family structure.
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selection into family structures related to child gender. 3.1 shows that there are
very few differences in child or parental characteristics by gender within or across
family structures, and that the few differences that exist are extremely small.
The only male-female gap that is statistically different across family structures
(difference-in-difference) is number of children. The male-female gap is 0.06 lower
in single parent families and 0.05 lower in blended families compared to tradi-
tional families. This is consistent with an extremely small difference in family
composition. In all other cases observables are balanced. In other words, child
gender appears to be nearly randomly assigned across family structures; boys and
girls are effectively equally likely to be observed in traditional, single, and blended
families.
In contrast to observable characteristics, which are essentially equal across
child gender within and across family structures, 3.2 shows that most health and
behavioral outcomes differ across gender within family structures. For example,
boys are more likely to have learning disabilities, developmental disabilities, emo-
tional difficulties, and asthma, and are less likely to have a good attention span
across all family structures. And at the top of the list of worse outcomes for
boys across all family structures is the probability of ADHD. The magnitude of
the gender gap between boys and girls in ADHD diagnosis is striking at 9 per-
cent, 11 percent, and 5 percent for single parent, blended, and traditional families
respectively.
Difference-in-difference calculations that compare the gaps between boys and
girls across family structures are presented in the last two columns of 3.2. These
results provide preliminary evidence that boys in non-traditional families are doing
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especially poorly. The gap between boys and girls in ADHD diagnosis is 3 percent-
age points larger in single parent families than in traditional families. Likewise,
the ADHD diagnosis gap 6 percentage points larger in blended than traditional
families. Similar gaps emerge in attention span and learning disabilities.
3.3 Empirical Specification
In order to test whether family structure affects the gender gap in ADHD
diagnosis, we use a linear probability framework that compares boys and girls in
traditional, single parent, and blended families:
ADHDirt = β0+β1Mirt+β2Sirt+β3Mirt∗Sirt+β4Birt+β5Mirt∗Birt+Xirtθ+γr+δs+εirt
ADHDirt is an indicator for whether or not child i living in region r interviewed in
year t has ever been diagnosed with ADHD. The variables M , S, and B indicate
that the child is male, living in a single parent household, or living in a blended
family household.6 The omitted group in the regression is girls in traditional
families. Unless otherwise stated, all regressions contain a vector of background
characteristics (X) that includes indicator variables for the number of children in
the family, race, and age, as well as birth weight, the age of the youngest parent in
the household, the education level of the most educated parent in the household,
and a 5th order polynomial in household income. Region and year fixed effects
absorb regional variation and control for a national time trend in ADHD diagnosis.
6Bertrand and Pan (2013) use the same identification strategy.
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The coefficient β1 is the male-female ADHD gap for traditional families. Simi-
larly, (β1+β3) and (β1+β5) are the male-female ADHD gaps for single parent and
blended families. The difference-in-difference estimate of the excess male-female
gap for single parent families relative to traditional families is then β3, and the
equivalent excess gap for blended families is β5.
As there is certainly non-random selection into family structure that is a func-
tion of parental characteristics, the coefficients β2 and β4 should not be interpreted
as the causal effect of single parenthood and blended family structure on ADHD
diagnosis. Although these coefficients are best thought about as simple correla-
tions, to the best of our knowledge the relationship between family structure and
ADHD has not been documented. For this reason we briefly discuss these findings
in 3.4.1.
In contrast, under the assumption that child gender is not an important de-
terminant of family structure, the male-female gap differences across family struc-
tures (β3 and β5) have a causal interpretation. While the balance we see across
observable characteristics is largely consistent with this view, one should nonethe-
less interpret cautiously. That being said, for selection to account for the very
large excess gender gaps we will report in 3.4.1, child gender based family structure
selection would have to be much larger than the previous literature suggests.
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3.4 Results
3.4.1 Family Structure and Gender Gaps in ADHD Diag-
nosis
3.3 presents regression estimates of the male-female gap in ADHD diagnosis
across family structures. Column 1 includes the entire sample of children between
the ages of 5 and 16, column 2 restricts the sample to children between the ages
of 5 and 10, and column 3 restricts the sample to children aged 11 to 16.
Two new findings emerge from the first column of 3.3. First, children in non-
traditional families have higher rates of ADHD than children in traditional fami-
lies. Girls in single parent (blended) families are 1.2 (2.4) percentage points more
likely to have an ADHD diagnosis than girls in traditional families. Boys in single
parent (blended) families are 4.7 (8.1) percentage points more likely to be diag-
nosed than boys in traditional families. Perhaps surprisingly, the rate of ADHD
is higher in blended families than single parent families.7 Although the increased
incidence of ADHD among children in single parent and blended families may
be partially due to unobserved household characteristics correlated with family
structure, the results are nevertheless interesting and previously undocumented.
7There is a large literature relating family structure to child outcomes; however, there is
no consensus on whether estimated relationships are causal or merely correlations. In general,
children in blended and single parent families fare similarly, but worse than children in traditional
families. However, differences in outcomes are not always found between children raised in
traditional and non-traditional families. See, for example, Ermisch and Francesconi (2001),
Painter and Levine (2000), Case, Lin, and McLanahan (1999), Case, Lin, and McLanahan
(2001), Evenhouse and Reilly (2004), Ginther and Pollak (2004), Gennetian (2005), Antecol and
Bedard (2007).
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The second new finding in the first column of 3.3 is that the male-female gap
in ADHD diagnosis is much larger in non-traditional families. While boys in tra-
ditional households are 5.5 percentage points more likely to have been diagnosed
with ADHD than girls, this gap is 3.5 percentage points larger in single parent
families and 5.7 percentage points larger in blended families. In both cases the
excess male-female gap (β3 and β5) is statistically significant at the 1% level.
The second and third columns of 3.3 show that the magnitude of the excess
gender gap in non-traditional families is similar for children ages 5-10 and 11-
16. That is, most of the gap emerges during early ages and does not widen
substantially as children enter pre-teen and teen years. The excess male-female
gap for single parent (blended) families is 3.5 (5.2) and 3.3 (5.6) percentage points
for ages 5-10 and 11-16, respectively. Because the gender gaps are essentially
identical across age ranges, the remainder of the paper uses the entire 5-16 age
range.
While the specification used in 3.3 controls for household income, number of
children in the household, and the age of the youngest parent in the household, it
is reasonable to wonder if the results are driven by certain income groups, family
sizes, or teen mothers. The first three columns of 3.4 report the results for 3.3
for each third of the income distribution. While a priori one might expect the
excess male-female gaps to be largest at low income levels, the estimates in Table
4 reveal that the excess gaps for single parent and blended families exist, and
are similar in size, across the entire income distribution. The point estimates
do fluctuate somewhat across income levels, but the majority have overlapping
confidence intervals. Although income may play a role in ADHD diagnosis, it
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does not appear to be a mechanism influencing differential gender gaps in diagnosis
across family structure.
The next three columns of 3.4 run 3.3 separately by number of children in the
household (family size). Again, the excess male-female gaps for single parent and
blended families are remarkably consistent across sub-sample. The point estimates
for the excess single parent male-female gap ranges from 3.3 to 4.0, and similarly
from 4.7 to 6.9 for blended families.
The last two columns of 3.4 run 3.3 separately by mothers age at first birth for
the subsample of children who live with their biological mother.8 The first column
includes children whose mother was a teenager when she had her first child and
the second column includes children whose mother was at least 20 years old at
her first birth. In single mother households, the excess gender gap is substantially
larger for children of teen moms - 5.6 compared to 3.2 percentage points. This
difference is statistically significant at conventional levels. That being said, the
excess gender gap among children of non-teen single mothers is still large at 3.2
percentage points. In contrast, in blended family households, maternal age at first
birth does not substantially affect the gender gap in ADHD diagnosis. But again,
the excess gender gap is large - 4.8 percentage points for children of teen moms
and 5.7 percentage points for children of non-teen moms.
Overall, we find large excess male-female ADHD gaps for single parent and
blended families compared to traditional families for all age, income, family size,
and age of mother at first birth groups. The magnitude of the gap and the ubiquity
of its presence is, perhaps surprising, and certainly cause for concern.
8The age of the mother is only known if the mother resides in the household.
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3.4.2 Family Structure and Gender Gaps in Other Cogni-
tive Outcomes
The size of the excess male-female ADHD gap for non-traditional families sug-
gests that we may see excess gaps in other cognitive outcomes related to, or result-
ing from, ADHD. Table 5 uses 3.3 to estimate the excess gaps in non-traditional
families for outcomes that one might think would be associated with ADHD: good
attention span, learning disability, developmental disability, emotional difficulties,
worried, and unhappy. The emotional difficulties variable includes difficulties in
emotions, concentration, behavior, or getting along with others. To the degree
that treatment of ADHD alleviates its symptoms, gaps in these outcomes will be
smaller than the gap in ADHD diagnosis.
The most striking result in 3.5 is the consistent male-female gap in cognitive
outcomes. Parents consistently report that boys have worse attention spans, are
more likely to have learning and developmental disabilities as well as emotional
difficulties, but are less worried and happier than girls. In both single parent and
blended households, an excess gender gap emerges for attention span, learning
disability, and emotional difficulties.9 One result does emerge that is not consistent
with the rest of our findings. In blended families, the sign on the coefficient for
the excess gap in developmental disabilities is negative, indicating that the male-
female gap in developmental disabilities is smaller in blended than traditional
families.
9Learning disabilities are frequently associated with ADHD. In a sample of 119 children,
Mayes, Calhoun, and Crowell (2000) find that 70 percent of children with ADHD also had a
learning disability.
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Notably, there is no excess gender gap in worry or unhappiness in non-traditional
families despite anxiety and depression being associated with ADHD. One reason
the excess gender gap in ADHD may not translate to an excess gender gap in
worry or unhappiness is boys lower likelihood of having internalizing symptoms,
which are more associated with anxiety and depression. In their meta-analysis of
gender differences in ADHD, Gershon and Gershon (2002) note that “females were
rated as higher on internalizing problems than males, suggesting that comorbid
conditions such as depression and anxiety may be more problematic for ADHD
females.”
3.4.3 Family Structure and Gender Gaps in Physical Health
3.6 presents results from regressions of gender and family type on physical
health using 3.3. In some sense, the results from 3.6 can be viewed as a falsifica-
tion test because diagnosis of physical health problems is inherently less subjective
than mental health diagnoses. Thus, we would not expect the gender gap in hear-
ing problems, ear infections, asthma, and food allergies to vary by family structure
as long as our regressions adequately control for other factors affecting these di-
agnoses. The coefficients on the interaction terms in 3.6 show that there is no
meaningfully large or consistent variation in physical health gender gaps by family
structure. With the exception of a small excess gender gap in hearing problems
in single parent households, the male-female gaps in ear infections, asthma, and
food allergies are the same in traditional and non-traditional families.
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3.5 Discussion
ADHD is the most common neurobehavioral disorder in childhood, yet seem-
ingly unusual patterns in diagnosis remain largely unexplained and imply that
the disorder is frequently under- and/or over-diagnosed. In this paper, we show
that family structure is an important factor affecting diagnosis of ADHD and that
family structure is particularly influential in the diagnosis of boys. First, we doc-
ument that a non-traditional family structure is positively correlated with ADHD
diagnosis for both boys and girls. Second, comparisons across family types show a
large excess male-female gap in ADHD diagnosis in non-traditional families. The
male-female gap in traditional, single parent, and blended families is 5.5, 9.0, and
11.2 percentage points, respectively. This excess gap in non-traditional families
is pronounced across child ages as well as maternal age at first birth and exists
across all levels of income and family size. The sheer magnitude of the excess
male-female gap suggests that it could have substantial long-term consequences
for boys in non-traditional families since ADHD and its symptoms are associated
with lower completed education, earnings, and labor market participation.
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Table 3.1: Child Demographics By Gender and Family Structure
Boys Girls Difference Boys Girls Difference Boys Girls Difference
Single-
Traditional
Blended-
Traditional
(1) (2) (1)-(2) (3) (4) (3)-(4) (5) (6) (5)-(6)
 [(1)-(2)]
-[(5)-(6)]
 [(3)-(4)]
-[(5)-(6)]
Parent Age 38.22 38.25 -0.03 35.27 35.38 -0.11 39.34 39.40 -0.06 0.03 -0.05
(7.93) (7.85) (6.82) (6.99) (6.65) (6.64)
# Children in Family 1.88 1.92 -0.04 2.09 2.12 -0.03 2.21 2.19 0.02 -0.06 -0.05
(0.97) (1.01) (1.08) (1.10) (0.99) (0.97)
Child Age 10.82 10.90 -0.07 11.22 11.23 -0.01 10.55 10.51 0.04 -0.11 -0.05
(3.50) (3.52) (3.39) (3.37) (3.53) (3.52)
Birth Weight (grams) 2,855 2,759 96 2,897 2,803 95 2,948 2,879 70 26 25
(1,287) (1,240) (1,280) (1,226) (1,287) (1,219)
Race
White 0.49 0.48 0.00 0.65 0.64 0.01 0.70 0.69 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.50) (0.50) (0.48) (0.48) (0.46) (0.46)
Black 0.28 0.28 -0.01 0.13 0.14 -0.01 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.00 -0.01
(0.45) (0.45) (0.34) (0.35) (0.25) (0.26)
American Native 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07)
Asian 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.21) (0.21)
Hispanic 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.36) (0.36) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35)
Other Race 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.18) (0.18)
Multiple Race 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08)
Highest Education Level of Parent(s)
Less than High School 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.37) (0.37) (0.31) (0.31) (0.27) (0.27)
High School Diploma or GED 0.3 0.29 0.01 0.28 0.28 0.00 0.19 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.46) (0.45) (0.45) (0.45) (0.39) (0.39)
Some College 0.36 0.37 -0.01 0.39 0.39 0.01 0.3 0.3 0.00 -0.01 0.00
(0.48) (0.48) (0.49) (0.49) (0.46) (0.46)
Bachelors Degree 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.33) (0.33) (0.36) (0.36) (0.43) (0.43)
Masters or More 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.07 -0.01 0.18 0.19 -0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.22) (0.22) (0.25) (0.26) (0.39) (0.39)
Household Income 30,079 29,911 167 52,760 52,462 299 71,036 71,094 -58 226 357
(24,055) (23,868) (35,155) (35,309) (34,664) (34,786)
N 13,679 13,135 6,519 6,316 30,794 28,705
Difference-in-Difference
Note: Summary statistics are from the 1998 to 2012 National Health Interview Survey.  Traditional families include both a biological mother and father. Single parent families include a single (unmarried and not 
cohabiting) biological parent. Blended families include a biological parent married or cohabiting with a non-biological parent of the sample child. The sample includes children between the ages of 5 and 16. 
Standard deviations are in parenthesis. Bolded cells indicate that the difference is statistically significant at the 5% level.
Single Parent Family Blended Family Traditional Family
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Table 3.2: Child Outcomes by Gender and Family Structure
Boys Girls Difference Boys Girls Difference Boys Girls Difference
Single-
Traditional
Blended-
Traditional
(1) (2) (1)-(2) (3) (4) (3)-(4) (5) (6) (5)-(6)
 [(1)-(2)]
-[(5)-(6)]
 [(3)-(4)]
-[(5)-(6)]
ADHD 0.15 0.06 0.09 0.19 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.06
(0.36) (0.24) (0.39) (0.26) (0.29) (0.18)
Good Attention Span 0.82 0.89 -0.07 0.79 0.88 -0.09 0.9 0.94 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05
(0.38) (0.31) (0.41) (0.33) (0.30) (0.24)
Learning Disability 0.14 0.08 0.06 0.14 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.02
(0.34) (0.26) (0.34) (0.27) (0.28) (0.21)
Developmental Disability 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.01
(0.24) (0.18) (0.22) (0.19) (0.21) (0.15)
Emotional Difficulties 0.31 0.21 0.10 0.33 0.26 0.07 0.19 0.13 0.06 0.04 0.01
(0.46) (0.41) (0.47) (0.44) (0.39) (0.33)
Worried 0.3 0.3 -0.01 0.3 0.32 -0.02 0.22 0.24 -0.02 0.01 0.00
(0.46) (0.46) (0.46) (0.47) (0.42) (0.43)
Unhappy 0.15 0.17 -0.01 0.16 0.17 -0.01 0.08 0.09 -0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.36) (0.37) (0.36) (0.37) (0.27) (0.29)
Hearing Problem 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.21) (0.18) (0.20) (0.19) (0.16) (0.16)
3+ Ear Infections in 12 Months 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.21) (0.22) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20)
Asthma 0.22 0.16 0.06 0.19 0.15 0.04 0.16 0.11 0.05 0.01 0.00
(0.41) (0.37) (0.40) (0.36) (0.36) (0.31)
Food Allergy 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.21) (0.21) (0.19) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20)
N 13,679 13,135 6,519 6,316 30,794 28,705
Note: Summary statistics are from the 1998 to 2012 National Health Interview Survey.  Traditional families include both a biological mother and father. Single parent families include a single (unmarried and 
not cohabiting) biological parent. Blended families include a biological parent married or cohabiting with a non-biological parent of the sample child. The sample includes children between the ages of 5 and 
16. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. Bolded cells indicate that the difference is statistically significant at the 5% level.
Single Parent Family Blended Family Traditional Family Difference-in-Difference
83
Chapter 3. Family Structure and the Gender Gap in ADHD Diagnosis
Table 3.3: Child Gender, Family Structure, and ADHD Diagnosis
5 - 16 
Years Old
5 - 10 
Years Old
11 - 16 
Years Old
Male 0.055*** 0.042*** 0.069***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Single Parent 0.012*** 0.006 0.017***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Male*Single Parent 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.033***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Blended 0.024*** 0.017*** 0.031***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Male*Blended 0.057*** 0.052*** 0.056***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
Mean of Dep. Var 0.0832 0.0636 0.101
Observations 99,148 48,044 51,104
R-squared 0.049 0.046 0.047
ADHD
Note: Table presents estimates of child gender and family structure on ADHD 
diagnosis using NHIS data from 1998 to 2012. The sample includes children ages 5 
to 16 years old. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.4: Child Gender, Family Structure, and ADHD Diagnosis by Income,
Family Size, and Mother’s Age at First Birth
Bottom Third Middle Third Top Third 1 2 3+ ≤19 >20
Male 0.064*** 0.052*** 0.063*** 0.055*** 0.061*** 0.047*** 0.051*** 0.055***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.002)
Single Parent 0.012** 0.004 0.007 0.006 0.011** 0.021*** 0.007 0.017***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004)
Male*Single Parent 0.023** 0.045*** 0.039** 0.035*** 0.033*** 0.040*** 0.056*** 0.032***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.019) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006)
Blended 0.015* 0.028*** 0.034*** 0.011 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.021** 0.029***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005)
Male*Blended 0.048*** 0.070*** 0.035** 0.069*** 0.047*** 0.054*** 0.048*** 0.057***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.009)
Mean of Dep. Var 0.111 0.0865 0.0734 0.0981 0.0811 0.0711 0.0926 0.0779
Observations 26,416 26,538 26,505 27,752 41,582 29,814 15,020 78,863
R-squared 0.055 0.055 0.042 0.050 0.049 0.047 0.058 0.047
Income Number of Children Mother's Age at First Birth
Note: Table presents estimates of child gender and family structure on ADHD diagnosis using NHIS data from 1998 to 2012. The sample includes children ages 5 to 16 years old. 
Households with a missing value for income are excluded from regressions by income group. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.5: Child Gender, Family Structure, and Cognitive Outcomes
Good Attention 
Span
Learning 
Disability
Developmental 
Disability
Emotional 
Difficulties Worried Unhappy
Male -0.036*** 0.041*** 0.025*** 0.019*** -0.019*** -0.014***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004)
Single Parent -0.012** -0.003 0.000 0.008** 0.053*** 0.051***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.009) (0.007)
Male*Single Parent -0.037*** 0.023*** 0.005 0.021*** 0.013 0.000
(0.008) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.011) (0.008)
Blended -0.035*** 0.017*** 0.013*** 0.031*** 0.061*** 0.058***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.011) (0.009)
Male*Blended -0.051*** 0.017** -0.010** 0.017** -0.000 0.003
(0.012) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.015) (0.012)
Mean of Dep. Var 0.892 0.0828 0.0380 0.0513 0.260 0.115
Observations 44,120 99,139 99,139 55,259 44,120 44,120
R-squared 0.031 0.031 0.015 0.025 0.036 0.029
Note: Table presents estimates of child gender and family structure on developmental outcomes using NHIS data from 1998 to 2012. The sample 
includes children ages 5 to 16 years old. Learning disability and developmental disability are included in the 1998 to 2012 surveys and difficulties is 
included in the 2004 to 2012 surveys. Worried, unhappy, and good attention span are included in the 2004 to 2007 and 2010 to 2012 surveys. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.6: Child Gender, Family Structure, and Physical Health
Hearing Problem
3+ Ear Infections 
in 12 Months Asthma Food Allergy
Male 0.003** -0.002 0.049*** -0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Single Parent -0.001 0.001 0.025*** -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Male*Single Parent 0.008** -0.002 0.009 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
Blended 0.005 0.003 0.023*** 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
Male*Blended 0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004)
Mean of Dep. Var 0.0314 0.0432 0.154 0.0437
Observations 99,139 99,139 99,139 99,139
R-squared 0.008 0.018 0.019 0.005
Note: Table presents estimates of child gender and family structure on health outcomes using NHIS data 
from 1998 to 2012. The sample includes children ages 5 to 16 years old. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix A. The Medicare Eligibility Gap
Figure A.1: Age Distribution of Younger Spouse Sample
Note: Graph shows the cumulative distribution function of younger spouses’ age by gender.
Figure A.2: First Stage Estimate
Note: The graph shows the fraction of older spouses that report having Medicare coverage
as a function of the age of the older spouse. The scatterplot is the raw data and the curves
are quadratic polynomial fits estimated separately on each side of the age-65 threshold. The
first-stage estimate of the take up of Medicare at age 65 among older spouses is 63.67 percent.
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Figure A.3: Education and Race of Younger Spouses
(a) Less than High School (b) High School
(c) Some College (d) College Plus
(e) White (f) Black (g) Hispanic
Note: Graphs show the fraction of younger spouses with each education level and race plotted
against the age of the older spouse. Scatterplots are means of the raw data and solid lines are
quadratic polynomial fits.
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Figure A.4: Labor Force Participation and Health Status of Younger Spouses
(a) Health Excellent/Very Good
(b) Working (c) Hours Worked
(d) Health Insurance Offered at Work
Note: Graphs show the fraction of younger spouses with a given labor force participation status
and health status plotted against the age of the older spouse. Scatterplots are means of the raw
data and solid lines are quadratic polynomial fits.
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Table A.1: Comparison of Bandwidth and Polynomial Choices in Regressions of
Insurance Coverage on Spousal and Own Medicare Eligibility
Degree of Polynomial Degree of Polynomial
First Order 24 Quarters 32 Quarters 40 Quarters First Order 24 Quarters 32 Quarters 40 Quarters
Spouse65 -1.14 -1.73** -1.65** Spouse65 -3.84** -3.23** -3.24**
(0.68) (0.59) (0.53) (1.31) (1.14) (1.06)
Self65 6.79*** 7.37*** 7.64*** Self65 6.98*** 7.07*** 7.31***
(0.53) (0.49) (0.46) (1.41) (1.18) (1.07)
Second Order Second Order
Spouse65 -0.15 -0.47 -1.24 Spouse65 -3.25 -3.79* -3.49*
(0.71) (0.71) (0.80) (1.63) (1.54) (1.47)
Self65 6.10*** 6.88*** 7.33*** Self65 6.14** 6.63*** 6.53***
(0.72) (0.62) (0.56) (1.91) (1.60) (1.44)
Third Order Third Order
Spouse65 1.78** 0.65 0.40 Spouse65 -2.57 -2.92 -3.15
(0.65) (0.65) (0.64) (1.76) (1.68) (1.65)
Self65 5.52*** 6.47*** 6.83*** Self65 6.28* 5.93** 6.24**
(0.80) (0.74) (0.67) (2.57) (2.14) (1.91)
Fourth Order Fourth Order
Spouse65 1.59* 1.64* 0.92 Spouse65 -2.29 -1.68 -2.92
(0.72) (0.67) (0.68) (2.03) (1.89) (1.77)
Self65 5.54*** 6.18*** 6.54*** Self65 5.28 4.85 5.18*
(0.98) (0.90) (0.85) (3.14) (2.68) (2.44)
Note: Table presents reduced form regression discontinuity estimates of spousal and own-Medicare eligibility on a dummy variable for own insurance 
coverage. Columns report estimates using a bandwidth of 24, 32, and 40 quarters around the age of 65. Estimates are presented for first, second, third, 
and fourth order polynomials in spousal and own age. Regressions include and age polynomial interacted with dummy variables for own and spousal 
Medicare eligibility at age 65, own race and education controls, dummy variables for own and spousal Social Security eligibility at age 62, region, and 
year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by spouse age and are presented in parentheses.
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Bandwidth
Panel A: Women Panel B: Men
Bandwidth
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Table A.2: Estimates of Discontinuities in Education, Race, Health Status, Labor
Force Participation, and Social Security Benefits of Younger Spouses
Less than High School High School Some College College or More
Spouse65 -0.27 0.74 -1.39 0.91
(1.11) (1.41) (0.95) (0.97)
White Black Hispanic
Good/Very Good/Excellent 
Health
Spouse65 -1.72* 0.89 0.59 0.01
(0.82) (0.65) (0.34) (1.20)
Working Hours Worked†
Health Insurance Offered 
at Work†‡
Receive Social Security 
Income‡
Spouse65 -0.38 -0.19 1.62 -0.28
(1.05) (0.63) (1.24) (1.12)
Note: Table presents estimates of discontinuities upon an older spouse reaching Medicare eligibility at age 65.  All dependent variables are point-in-
time except for receipt of Social Security income, which is during the previous calendar year. Regressions include quadratics in age interacted with 
dummy variables for own and spousal Medicare eligibility at age 65, dummy variables for own and spousal Social Security eligibility at age 62, 
region, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by spouse age and are presented in parentheses.
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
†Conditional on working.
‡Regression includes years 1997 - 2011.
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Table A.3: The Impact of Medicare Eligibility of the Younger Spouse on Insurance
Coverage of the Younger Spouse
Mean RD Mean RD Mean RD
Self65 91.36 7.33*** 15.60 67.34*** 82.78 -8.10*** 10.74 49.18***
(0.56) (0.88) (0.91) (1.00)
Mean RD Mean RD Mean RD Mean RD
Self65 36.98 -3.93** 4.65 5.44*** 30.31 -11.62*** 12.87 1.31
(1.29) (0.73) (0.96) (0.81)
Mean RD Mean RD Mean RD
Self65 91.81 6.53*** 22.60 58.23*** 78.19 -10.00*** 12.48 38.93***
(1.44) (2.14) (2.28) (2.35)
Mean RD Mean RD Mean RD Mean RD
Self65 14.43 -0.04 1.11 1.12 53.06 -17.27*** 10.84 5.96**
(1.59) (0.76) (2.43) (2.01)
Insured Government Private 2+ Plans
Panel A: Women
Insured Government Private 2+ Plans
Spouse (Work) Spouse (Non-Work) Self (Work) Self (Non-Work)
Panel B: Men
Spouse (Work) Spouse (Non-Work) Self (Work) Self (Non-Work)
Note: Table presents reduced form estimates of spousal Medicare eligibility and own Medicare eligibility on own insurance coverage 
using NHIS data from 1993 to 2011.  Entries in the 'Mean' column are means of own insurance coverage for the two years prior to 
spousal Medicare eligibility (first row of each panel) or own Medicare eligibility (second row of each panel). Regressions include 
quadratics in age interacted with dummy variables for own and spousal Medicare eligibility at age 65, own race and education controls, 
dummy variables for own and spousal Social Security eligibility at age 62, region, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by 
spouse age and are presented in parentheses.
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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Figure A.5: Density of Spousal Age
Note: The graph plots the number of older spouses in the sample at each age to test for violation
of the continuity assumption. The curves are quadratic polynomial fits estimated separately on
each side of the age-65 threshold. The estimated discontinuity at age 65 is not statistically
significant.
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Appendix B. Medicaid Coverage of Smoking Cessation Treatment and Smoking
Table B.1: Use of Nicotine Replacement Therapies and Pharmacotherapies
State
Year Any Coverage 
Began 0 1 2 3 4
Illinois 2000 2283 5890 11055 14451 14982
West Virginia 2000 1381 2232 2633 2459 2505
Kentucky1 2001 0 0 0 0 0
South Dakota 2001 17 25 76 67 10
Utah 2001 78 335 450 507 502
Mississippi 2001 1855 1874 1304 1989 1447
Nebraska1 2002 0 0 0 0 0
Pennsylvania 2002 2377 4824 4303 4042 3625
Washington1 2002 14 18 7 3 0
Illinois 2000 0.76 1.92 3.34 4.57 4.42
West Virginia 2000 2.65 4.17 4.78 4.47 4.56
Kentucky1 2001 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
South Dakota 2001 0.10 0.14 0.39 0.33 0.05
Utah 2001 0.16 0.63 0.63 0.65 0.65
Mississippi 2001 2.69 2.35 1.56 2.11 1.46
Nebraska1 2002 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pennsylvania 2002 0.92 1.78 1.43 1.20 0.94
Washington1 2002 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Years Since Coverage Began
Note: This table displays the number of units of nicotine replacement and pharmacotherpy 
prescribed per adult Medicaid beneficiary for the year coverage initiated in the state and the 
following 4 years. Data is Medicaid State Drug Utilization data available online from 
Medicaid.gov. 
1State only covered counseling.
Panel A: Number of Doses Prescribed (100's)
Panel B: Number of Doses Prescribed Per Adult Beneficiary (100's)
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Table B.2: Probit Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Smoke Smoke Smoke
Smoke 
Every Day
Smoke 
Every Day
Smoke 
Every Day
Smoking Cessation Covered -0.0623*** -0.0530*** -0.0493*** -0.0468*** -0.0380*** -0.0347***
(0.0155) (0.0170) (0.0152) (0.0161) (0.0133) (0.0133)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.706 0.706 0.706 0.583 0.583 0.583
State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
RegionxYear FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
State Linear Trends YES YES YES YES YES YES
Individual Controls NO YES YES NO YES YES
State Controls NO NO YES NO NO YES
Observations 37,281 37,281 37,281 37,281 37,281 37,281
Note: The table shows marginal effects from probit regressions of smoking behavior on a dummy variable for 
Medicaid coverage of smoking cessation therapies using the CPS-TUS. The sample includes parents with 1 to 5 
children and family income below 200% of the poverty line. Individual controls include gender, age categories, 
education dummies,  family income dummies, an indicator variable for married/cohabiting, and the number of 
children. State controls include the parental Medicaid threshold as a percentage of the poverty line, the 
unemployment rate, the cigarette tax per pack, and the number of indoor smoking restrictions. Standard errors are in 
parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B.3: Probit Regressions by Demographic Characteristics
(1) (2)
Smoke Smoke Every Day
Gender
Female -0.0633*** -0.0264
[n=21,078] (0.0153) (0.0181)
[0.719] [0.598]
Male -0.0227 -0.0110
[n=16,203] (0.0278) (0.0258)
[0.692] [0.566]
Education
Less than High School Education -0.144*** -0.109***
[n=9,688] (0.0316) (0.0330)
[0.756] [0.624]
High School Education 0.0328 0.0550**
[n=16,317] (0.0237) (0.0237)
[0.730] [0.613]
Some College or More -0.0778** -0.0586
[n=11,276] (0.0356) (0.0377)
[0.621] [0.499]
Income
Income <100% FPL -0.0884*** -0.0533*
[n=14,638] (0.0301) (0.0315)
[0.763] [0.624]
Income ≥100% FPL -0.0161 0.00102
[n=22,643] (0.0244) (0.0214)
[0.669] [0.557]
State FE YES YES
Year FE YES YES
RegionxYear FE YES YES
State Linear Trends YES YES
Individual Controls YES YES
State Controls YES YES
Note: The table shows marginal effects from probit regressions of smoking behavior 
on a dummy variable for Medicaid coverage of smoking cessation therapies using the 
CPS-TUS. Each cell includes the coefficient of interest from a separate regression. The 
sample includes parents with 1 to 5 children and family income below 200% of the 
poverty line. Individual controls include gender, age categories, education dummies,  
family income dummies, an indicator variable for married/cohabiting, and the number 
of children. State controls include the parental Medicaid threshold as a percentage of 
the poverty line, the unemployment rate, the cigarette tax per pack, and the number of 
indoor smoking restrictions. Standard errors are in parentheses and the mean of the 
dependent variable is in brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix B. Medicaid Coverage of Smoking Cessation Treatment and Smoking
Table B.4: Probit Regressions by Age of Youngest Child
(1) (2)
Smoke Smoke Every Day
Smoking Cessation Covered*Youngest Child 0 to 1 -0.0517*** -0.0558***
(0.0111) (0.0109)
Smoking Cessation Covered*Youngest Child 2 to 5 -0.0124 -0.0217
(0.0116) (0.0155)
Smoking Cessation Covered*Youngest Child 6 to 17 -0.00406 0.00241
(0.0104) (0.00893)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.706 0.583
State FE YES YES
Year FE YES YES
RegionxYear FE YES YES
State Linear Trends YES YES
Individual Controls YES YES
State Controls YES YES
Observations 37,281 37,281
Note: The table shows marginal effects from probit regressions of smoking behavior on a dummy 
variable set equal to 1 if Medicad covers smoking cessation therapy interacted with a dummy variables 
for the age of the youngest child in the household.  The sample includes parents with 1 to 5 children 
and family income below 200% of the poverty line. Individual controls include gender, age, age 
squared, education dummies,  family income dummies, an indicator variable for married/cohabiting, 
and the number of children. State controls include the parental Medicaid threshold as a percentage of 
the poverty line, the unemployment rate, the cigarette tax per pack, and the number of indoor smoking 
restrictions. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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